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ABSTRACT
THE MEMORIALIZATION OF HISTORICAL MEMORIES IN EAST ASIA
Bo Ram Yi
Old Dominion University, 2017
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

East Asia is embroiled in one of the most titillating historical memory wars in presentday politics. A highly complex and intricate matter, conflict over history is the underpinning
strain behind political and social relations between China, South Korea and Japan. Mired by the
past, tension often rises from conflict over the Yasakuni Shrine visits, comfort women and the
textbook matter.
This dissertation will examine how China, South Korea and Japan maintain their
historical memory narratives. Through a case study method, each state is analyzed through five
factors: commemoration, rhetoric, education, compensation and punishment.
Overall, China and South Korea have maintained relatively stable historical memory
narratives while Japan has exhibited a rather volatile one. Further, historical memory is
significant to political leaders and will likely be part of trilateral relations for the foreseeable
future. In spite of it all, minor advancements have been made in the overall historical memory
war.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In late 2013, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe paid homage to the polemical Yasakuni
Shrine.1 Built in 1869, the site commemorates the lives of fallen soldiers who fought for their
nation.2 Shrouded by controversy, the shrine includes 14 Class A war criminals who were found
guilty of World War II war crimes by the Tokyo Tribunal.3 The Prime Minister’s visit invoked
strong reactions from neighboring Asian states from outrage to diplomatic standstills. In an
unprecedented move, U.S. officials asked Prime Minister Abe not to visit the Yasakuni Shrine in
the future.4
Indeed, in recent decades history has become the arbiter of conflict. The inability to
reconcile the past has stymied bilateral relations between Japan, China and South Korea.
Diplomatic standstills and rising tensions have become a common occurrence in recent times. To
add to the quandary, the global phenomenon of China’s rise has heightened the region’s visibility
around the world.
One of the greatest paradoxes in international politics is the continuous memory war
between China, Japan and South Korea. As some scholars focus on why this memory war
continues, we will examine how this memory is maintained. This dissertation’s intent is to
examine each state’s efforts in maintaining their historical narrative. This will be implemented
through the analysis of five factors: commemoration, rhetoric, education, compensation and
punishment.

1

Hayashi Yuka et al., "U.S. Seeks Assurance Abe Won't Visit War Shrine Again," Wall Street Journal - Eastern
Edition 263, no. 20 (2014).
2
Yasakuni Shrine, "About Yasakuni Shrine," http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/about/index.html.
3
Ibid.
4
Yuka et al., "U.S. Seeks Assurance Abe Won't Visit War Shrine Again."
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EAST ASIA
In his 2011 address to the Australian Parliament, President Barack Obama remarked,
“after a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United
States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.”5 The speech
became part of his administration’s foreign policy shift or pivot to Asia.
The pivot to Asia was a moniker for the administration’s refocusing from the Middle East
region to Asia. It represents a newfound focus of reengaging politically and economically with
states as well as interacting with multinational institutions. As President Obama once remarked,
Here, we see the future. As the world’s fastest-growing region – and home to more than
half the global economy – the Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and
that’s creating jobs and opportunity for the American people. With most of the world’s
nuclear power and some half of humanity, Asia will largely define whether the century
ahead will be marked by conflict or cooperation, needless suffering or human progress.6
As East Asia has become elevated on the agendas of countries like the U.S., the region
has garnered increasing international attention. Rife with a potential nuclear North Korea,
tensions over island disputes, maritime aggression and power posturing, the region has
undergone significant shifts in recent decades. Simultaneously, East Asia has amassed an
increased level of economic and political power.
Indeed, China is ranked as the world’s second largest economy with its 1.3 billion
population, making it the most populated nation and one of the last remaining communist

5

The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,"
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament.
6
Ibid.
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countries.7 Some economists predict that China will overtake the U.S. as the world’s largest
economy in the coming decades.8 With 94 Fortune 500 companies, second only to the United
States,9 and 340 billionaires,10 China’s economic influence is strong.
Japan, the world’s second largest economy until 2010, is currently ranked third. It
maintained the second highest number of Fortune 500 countries—57—until 2014, when it
dropped to third.11 Additionally, South Korea has the world’s 13th largest economy and straddles
a landmass with one of the last remaining communist countries in the world. It is ranked as the
seventh highest number of Fortune 500 companies in the world with 12 companies.12
Further, the region holds one out of five permanent Security Council members,13 three
members of the World Trade organization14 and two of the highest debt holders of the U.S. Both
China and Japan have around $1.2 trillion of U.S. debt each. However, in an April 2015 report,
Japan edged out China as the highest U.S. debt holder for the first time in the past six years.15
The International Monetary Fund’s 2015 World Economic Outlook report contends that the
region at large will most likely have the most superior performance of any other region in the
world.16

7

The World Bank, "Population, Total," The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.
Elena Holodny, "China's Gdp Is Expected to Surpass the Us' in 11 Years,"
http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-gdp-is-expected-to-surpass-the-us-in-11-years-2015-6.
9
Kevin Bloomfield Bob Carroll, Meaghan Maher, "The Changing Headquarters Landscape for Fortune Global 500
Companies," (2014), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-the-changing-headquarters-landscape-forfortune-global-500-companies/$FILE/EY-the-changing-headquarters-landscape-for-fortune-global-500companies.pdf.
10
Drake Baer, "This Amazing Chart Shows How Fast China Is Adding Billionaires,"
http://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-billionaires-increase-over-past-decade-2015-1.
11
Bob Carroll, "The Changing Headquarters Landscape for Fortune Global 500 Companies".
12
Ibid.
13
United Nations, "Current Members," http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/.
14
World Trade Organization, "Understanding the Wto: The Organization Members and Observers,"
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
15
Charles Riley, "Japan Now Holds More U.S. Debt Than China," 2015.
16
International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook," International Monetary Fund,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/pdf/text.pdf.
8
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Indeed, pundits and scholars now debate the rise of China with the nation’s growing
economic prowess. A projected timeline of when China may surpass the U.S. as the world
superpower has also emerged. By contrast, others like Fareed Zakaria and Paul Kennedy debate
the inevitable U.S. decline. Some argue that the U.S. is not declining but, rather, others are
rising, like Joseph Nye and his often-used colloquial the “rise of the rest.”17 Even others
hypothesize that the prophecy theory of fearing that the U.S. will decline may compel that to
come true.
Such dialogue was non-existent in the past century when China was a lesser known
power, overshadowed by Japan. As of late, that power preponderance has changed. China is
considered the strongest rising power in the Asian region and a formidable challenger for the
world superpower spot in the future.
HISTORICAL MEMORY DEBATE
East Asia is embroiled in one of the most titillating historical memory wars in present day
politics. A highly complex and intricate matter, conflict over history lies as the underpinning
strain behind political and social relations between China, South Korea and Japan. Mired by
differences in the past, China and South Korea continue to resurrect history.
While East Asia is growing in political and economic influence worldwide, the region has
unresolved matters that impact state relations. Many scholars refer to this as the infamous
“history problem” of East Asia. Other latitudes include memory war, haunted by history, ancient

17

Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).
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anger, the war of resistance against Japan, history wars and clash of histories.18 President of
South Korea, Park Geun-hye, calls this the “Asian Paradox.”19 She argued,
The disconnect between growing economic interdependence on the one hand and
backward political-security cooperation on the other. How we manage this paradox …
will determine the shape of a new order in Asia.20
The memory war references the pasts of China, Japan and South Korea. While the
historical conflicts include other countries and time periods, for the purposes of this dissertation
the focus is on East Asia, specifically China, Japan and South Korea, and the early to mid-1900s.
For China and Japan, the “past” is in reference to the second Sino-Japanese War of 19371945, alternatively called the War of Anti-Japanese Resistance.21 The war began when Japan
instigated the Marco Polo Bridge skirmish at what is now known as Beijing.22 Japan previously
stoked China’s ire with the first Sino-Japanese war in which Japan came out as the victor and
claimed Taiwan, Manchuria and other land parcels in the late 19th century.23 China faced 15
million casualties and homeless refugees in the range of 60-95 million.
Japan is cited for their aggressive measures. The most well-known incident during that
time is what is known as the “Rape of Nanjing.” It is estimated that 250,000-300,000 Chinese

18

Gi-Wook and Sneider Shin, Daniel, "History Wars in Northeast Asia," Foreign Affairs,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141116/gi-wook-shin-and-daniel-c-sneider/history-wars-in-northeast-asia.
19
Yuka Hayashi, "South Korea’s President Presses Japan During U.S. Visit," The Wall Street Journal,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324744104578472530440590490.
20
Ibid.
21
Steve Phillips, "The Second Sino-Japanese War," Oxford Bibliographies,
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0141.xml.
22
The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Marco Polo Bridge Incident," in Encyclopaedia Britannica (2008).
23
"Sino-Japanese War," (2008).
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civilians were murdered and approximately 20,000 women were raped.24 Some Chinese women
were also forced into sexual slavery in what is known as “comfort women.”25
South Korea was colonized by Japan from 1910-1945. During that time, Japan integrated
a systemic approach to implementing the Japanese culture. The Japanese language was taught at
schools in an effort to eradicate the use of the Korean language including the study of Korean
history. Beyond cultural efforts, “the Koreans were deprived of freedom of assembly,
association, the press and speech.”26
In time, citizens attempted to usurp Japanese control. In 1919 the Korean independence
movement began. Korean demonstrators were ultimately suppressed or killed. For a brief period
of time some freedom was allotted only to be suppressed once again in 1931 with military rule.
Particularly when World War II started Japan renewed its efforts to make the Korean nation a
true Japanese colony. The Shinto religion was mandated and citizens’ names were changed to
Japanese names. Koreans were drafted into the Japanese army and women were forced into
sexual slavery.27
The contention is centered on how China and South Korea perceive Japan in relation to
its level of remorse for the past. Although Japan has made statements of regret and apology,
China and South Korea argue that it does not appear to be genuine. Apologetic statements are
sometimes followed by actions that are considered contrary to the rhetoric. The inability to
accept Japan’s apology hinges upon history textbooks and the Yasakuni Shrine visits. For South
Korea, there is also a third addition of the comfort women.

24

British Broadcasting Corporation, "History," British Broadcasting Corporation,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/05/china_japan/html/history.stm.
25
Shuko Ogawa, "The Difficulty of Apology: Japan's Struggle with Memory and Guilt," Harvard International
Review 22, no. 3 (2000).
26
Ki-baik Lee Kwang-rin Lee, Bae-ho Hahn, Young Ick Lew, "Korea," in Encyclopaedia Brittanica (2015).
27
Bae-ho Hahn Ki-baik Lee, Young Ick Lew, Kwang-rin Lee, "Korea," in Encyclopaedia Britannica (2015).
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Japan’s Prime Minister has occasionally opted to visit the Yasakuni Shrine, which
commemorates fallen soldiers. The point of controversy circles around the fact that the shrine
includes 14 Class A war criminals from World War II. It is viewed as another form of evidence
that Japan is not sincerely remorseful.
Secondly, the history textbooks in Japan are screened by their Ministry of Education. In
recent years, the textbooks have been criticized for their lack of depicting history accurately.
Terms such as aggression and invasion have been replaced with softer terminology. Internally,
Japan has two primary groups that differ in relation to history. Some argue that Japan was the
liberator of Asia and the past should be reflected in a more positive light. Further, teaching
history that is too critical of the past can hurt nationalistic sentiment among citizens. In
juxtaposition, others are supportive of writing about the past in a more critical light.
Lastly, while both China and South Korea have citizens who served as comfort women,
or sex slaves, to Japanese soldiers, only South Korea has brought this as a point of diplomatic
contention. As of late, this matter has drawn the most derision from South Korea. Although the
comfort women were of different nationalities such as Chinese, Japanese and Vietnamese, most
were Korean. South Korea argues that Japan has not fully acknowledged its action and the
women have not been compensated. In 2015 Japan and South Korea reached a bilateral
agreement resolving the comfort women matter.
To be sure, the memory problem is becoming a critical issue. While the nations have
made progress through bilateral relations and trade, they are also stymied by a past that continues
to be reiterated. At the outset, it appears that China and South Korea have difficulty letting past
recriminations go, while Japan is increasingly growing impatient with the lack of progress. Thus,

8
it appears that China and South Korea are maintaining their roles as the victims to Japan’s past
aggression, while Japan is continuously depicted as the perpetrator.
RESEARCH QUESTION & METHODOLOGY
In this dissertation I examine a challenge that the region currently faces, the continued
irresolution of the historical memory debate. How are historical memories being maintained and
in what manner?
In order to answer this query, I am conducting a qualitative study with three case studies.
The case study method will allow for the examination of the following countries:
1. China
2. South Korea
3. Japan
These three nations were selected due to their significant role in East Asia as well as their
predominant role in this historical memory war.
In an effort to provide a standardized measure of study, all three countries will be
reviewed for the same five factors: rhetoric, commemoration, education, compensation and
punishment. How is each factor being maintained by each country in reference to the events of
the early 20th century? I hypothesize that South Korea and Japan will primarily utilize
commemoration, rhetoric and education in maintaining their historical narratives. By contrast,
China will utilize all five factors.
The selection of these measures was based upon the book War, Guilt, and World Politics
after World War II. Berger utilizes the measures in assessing Germany, Austria and Japan. His
analysis of the findings were focused by “looking at the overall range of policies – as opposed to

9
a single policy – it may be possible to gauge more accurately the degree of contrition or
impenitence of the official narrative.”28
Thomas Berger utilized these components to ascertain whether a state was penitent or
impenitent in regard to historical misdeeds.29 His work is significant due to his method of
analysis. While Berger is noted for his work here, others have confirmed the values of
“commemoration, educational textbooks, and official political rhetoric.”30
EXPLORATORY QUESTIONS
Rhetoric is in reference to how leaders discuss past events. For the purposes of this study,
the leader is identified as the occupant of a nation’s highest-held office. While we recognize that
leaders can discuss events through many modes of communication, we will focus on speeches
given during 2005-2015. We will examine all speeches to identify the ones that reference the
past.
“Museums, monuments and holidays” are assessed to determine how a state
commemorates the past.31 We will look for existing holidays and state celebration practices. For
museums and monuments, we will look for those that highlight the early 20th century past with
Japan and the frequency at which the state established these over time.
Educating citizens is another avenue in which historical influence can be rendered. In this
particular context history textbooks are at the center of much controversy. What efforts are the
government doing to contain or to expand the textbook controversy? To what extent are history
textbooks controlled by the state? Does the state have an approval process? Is the state working

28

Thomas U. Berger, War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War Ii (Cambridge: Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press, 2012).
29
Ibid.
30
Katherine Hite, "International Encyclopedia of Political Science," (Thousand Oaks
Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2011).
31
Berger, War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War Ii.
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on any national efforts to resolve the matter? Textbooks are examined primarily on the domestic
level with a consideration of national efforts.
Furthermore, does the state have “policies aiming to help victims of past injustices?”32
Does the state do anything to reward those who are following their narrative? Are they honoring
and compensating soldiers from the past? While the state may be compensating victims, does the
state also dole out any punishment? Both “perpetrators of injustice as well as policies that restrict
freedom of speech and organization” are identified as forms of punishment. Essentially, are they
punishing anyone who disagrees with their narrative?
SIGNIFICANCE
Historical memory serves as the undercurrent that weaves among talks, disputes and
bilateral relations. The rising tensions and diplomatic standstills are emblematic of an issue that
persistently incites regional challenges. In an effort to further understand the region, more studies
are pertinent to move toward a clearer understanding of what is taking place and how to
potentially resolve it.
East Asia has been through many changes within the past century. China, a previously
unrecognized communist country has grown in leaps and bounds through its economy and
strengthening military forces. North Korea is considered a hotspot for nuclear weapon ambitions.
Their relationship with South Korea is also tense with the bifurcated border. Japan, once
considered the regional power, is now jockeying for position with China. As a democratic nation,
South Korea has been a pivotal buffer country against the communist North Korea and China.
A nuclear North Korea has brought together these nations in an effort to collaborate and
mitigate the situation. However, their meeting in March 2015 was three years after their last

32

Ibid.
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one.33 The meeting was expected to take place in 2013, but was cancelled. Japan’s prime
minister visited the Yasukuni Shrine that year, and a chagrined China and South Korea cancelled
the trilateral meeting.34 Citing irreconcilable differences over history, the meeting was placed on
hold.
2008-2012 was considered a rather warm period of trilateral relations within the region,
but 2012-2015 was considered a chilling moratorium.35 In 2015, there was a slight shift toward
improved collaboration. The U.S. has recognized the contentious relationship between South
Korea and Japan as a critical concern.36 Because they are allies to the U.S., the bilateral
relationship needs to be improved; otherwise, it impacts the U.S. stance in the region.
SETUP OF DISSERTATION
This dissertation consists of six chapters. It begins with an introductory chapter that
covers the region at large, historical memory debate, research methodology and significance. It is
succeeded by a chapter on the literature review of historical memory studies in the East Asian
field and that identifies a current gap in the literature.
Chapters three to five will provide a case study analysis of China, South Korea and
Japan. These segments will begin with their respective historical memory narratives followed by
the analysis of its commemoration efforts, education, rhetoric, punishment and compensation. It
will conclude with an overall assessment of the state at large. Lastly, chapter six will provide an
analysis of the three case studies by examining the extent to which a factor is utilized in

33

Choe Sang-Hun, "Chinese, Japanese and South Korean Ministers to Resume Three-Way Talks," The New York
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/world/asia/chinese-japanese-south-korean-ministers-trilateraltalks.html.
34
The British Broadcasting Corporation, "China, Japan and South Korea Hold Renewed Talks," The British
Broadcasting Corporation, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31997576.
35
Jeyup Kwaak, "Chinese, Japanese, South Korean Foreign Ministers Seek to Ease Tensions," The Wall Street
Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-japanese-south-korean-foreign-ministers-seek-to-ease-tensions1426938107.
36
Corporation, "China, Japan and South Korea Hold Renewed Talks".
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maintaining the state’s status quo. It will further discern whether any progress has been made on
the historical memory debate, as well as any notable patterns.
CONCLUSION
This study finds that historical memory is significant to political leaders and is unlikely to
be fully resolved any time soon. China and South Korea have shifted their stance on history over
the course of numerous decades. However, they have maintained a stable official historical
narrative over the past 10 years. Further, Japan has exhibited a volatile official historical
narrative that has imbued a sense of unpredictability. The overall instability has led to continuing
levels of tension in the region. Overall, small progress on history has been made, however it
most likely will remain part of political discourse in the foreseeable future.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Historically, memory was examined within the fields of “anthropology, sociology,
communication, rhetoric, and history”1 up to the 1920s. The predominant focal point became
individual memory and the concept of recollection.2 Over time, memory became comparable to
the utilization of class and gender in the history field.
Political science scholars did not explore this area until around the 1980s in what is often
referred to as the “memory boom.”3As one scholar notes, “Like culture more generally, it was
considered either a default category or an irrelevant factor for the core of political analysisinterests and institutions—and was best left to the humanities or sociology.”4 As the field
expanded, it brought the studies of collective memory, historical memory and politics of memory
to the fore.
This chapter will provide a literature review on historical memory. It begins by providing
an overview of collective memory to juxtapose historical memory. A definition of historical
memory is provided followed by a segment on memory politics. The chapter will delve into how
scholars have researched state efforts in maintaining their historical narratives. Lastly, the
chapter offers a gap in the literature with a segment on exploratory questions.

1

James V. Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge, U.K. ; New
York : Cambridge University Press, 2002).
2
Anne Whitehead, Memory, 1st ed.. ed. (London ; New York: London ; New York : Routledge, 2009).
3
Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, The Collective Memory Reader (New York: New
York : Oxford University Press, 2011).
4
Eric Langenbacher and Friederike Eigler, "Introduction: Memory Boom or Memory Fatigue in 21st Century
Germany?," German Politics & Society 23, no. 3 (76) (2005).
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COLLECTIVE MEMORY
Collective memory contends that the past is not about whether the truth is being
recognized or remembered, but, rather, the recollection of a memory is socialized based on the
group. “History enters into social life through the means by which individuals, organizations, and
states interpret, recall, and commemorate the past.”5 Further, the types of groups are vast as they
can range from families to communities. While each individual of the group hold memories of
their own, they often are tied to events or notable life moments. Thus, over time certain
memories hold greater significance and represent socialization for the group as a whole.6
In order to discern where collective memory began, we must consider the works of Henri
Bergson, Emile Durkheim and Maurice Halbwachs. Bergson presents the idea that individuals
have different experiences of an event and thus diverging memories. “Remembering as active
engagement” is a phrase that is often associated with Bergson. Perhaps what made Bergson so
notable was his breach from the general objective approach of rationalism in his time.
Like Bergson, Durkheim also believes in the subjectivity of memory. However, his work
focuses on the sociological lens. Rather, he contends that there is variability “based on
differences among forms of social organization” and that “different societies produce different
concepts of time.”7 Thus, time in general is viewed as the social construction. Indeed, Durkheim
and Bergson believed in the subjectivity of memory or that there is a “variability of individual
experience.”8 Thus, they tend to refute the objective memory experience.
Maurice Halbwachs, often called the father of collective memory, drew from both
Bergson and Durkheim with the idea that individual memory shifts over time and the potential
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influence of the social lens. Most of all this was recognized as a “shift from the cognitive
preoccupations of philosophy and psychology to the cultural concerns of sociology and
anthropology.”9 Therefore, collective memory presents one theoretical approach to how
individuals remember the past in a group setting.
Halbwachs’ work is primarily focused on the significance of social frameworks and
“socially framed individual memories.”10 Individuals may have their own memories, but memory
is formed and recalled based on the social context. It is about how the group setting constructs
the recalled memories.
He further contends, “It is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is
also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories.”11 In relation to these
social frameworks, Halbwachs recognized how vast the types were. In his 1925 work he focuses
on family, religion and social class.12
Society for Halbwachs is both elusive and ever present. He contends that “when people
think they are alone, face to face with themselves, other people appear and with them the groups
of which they are members.”13 While there is a natural inclination for individuals to recollect
memories of the past, it is inevitably placed in a social setting. Therefore, Halbwachs suggests
that the setting may alter the memory even if only marginally. He states,
society from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in thought previous
events of their lives, but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them so,
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however convinced we are that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige that
reality did not possess.14
Some scholars have debated the necessity of having a collective memory concept when
the field already has individual memory and history.15 Others argue that memory as a separate
concept has faced challenges in relation to defining what memory is. Yet still others argue
whether collective memory is an analogy or a metaphor. For example, Novick contends, “when
we speak of collective memory, we often forget that we’re employing a metaphor—an organic
metaphor—that makes an analogy between the memory of an individual and that of a
community.”16
Other prominent scholars who have based their work on Halbwachs include Jeffrey Olick
and James Wertsch. Perhaps these scholars differentiate it best, as Wertsch believes that memory
is “in the group” versus Olick’s viewpoint of memory “of the group.”17 Essentially, Wertsch may
be able to accept the collective memory concept as existing within the setting of a group, but that
it may not actually exist on its own. In contrast, Olick is more open to the idea that collective
memory is a concept that can stand alone. Wertsch’s work is focused on the lack of being able to
explain who is in charge of the “collective memory.”18 How does one prove that it exists? Thus,
herein lies the crux of why Wertsch is unable to accept the concept without a group setting.
Similar to Olick, some scholars view collective memory as “not limited to the sum of its
members’ memories. Instead, collective remembering is a dynamic process involving interaction
among its members, from which emerges something new that is different from the sum of the
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isolated memories of the individuals in the collective.”19 This is what scholars refer to as
“transcendent collective memory.”20
Collective memory under Halbwach has also faced some criticism. Scholars like Noa
Gedi, Paul Ricoeur and Yigal Elam have often debated the extent of Halbwachs breach from
Durkheim’s initial postulation.21 His neglect of the individual has brought much debate. “He
does not make any statement regarding individual representations, nor does he deny that they
exist.”22
The field at large is not simply about whether memory is objective or subjective, but that
it is influenced by numerous factors. Such influences could include “social frameworks, enabled
by changing media technologies, confronted with cultural institutions, and shaped by political
circumstances.”23
HISTORICAL MEMORY
Historical memory is often synonymously identified with terms such as collective
memory and politics of memory.24 Perhaps Halbwachs said it best in differentiating collective
memory and history. Collective memory
is a current of continuous thought whose continuity is not at all artificial, for it retains
from the past only what still lives or is capable of living in the consciousness of the
groups keeping the memory alive. By definition it does not exceed the boundaries of this
group. When a given period ceases to interest the subsequent period, the same group has
not forgotten a part of its past, because, in reality, there are two successive groups, one
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following the other. History divides the sequence of centuries into periods, just as the
content of a tragedy is divided into several acts. But in a play the same plot is carried
from one act to another and the same characters remain true to form to the end, their
feelings and emotions developing in an unbroken movement. History, however, gives the
impression that everything—the interplay of interests, general orientations, modes of
studying men and events, traditions, and perspectives on the future—is transformed from
one period to another.25
Halbwachs defines historical memory as “how we can participate in collective
remembering of events we did not personally experience or people we never knew.”26 He further
contends that it is “memory which is transmitted to us via various media including written and
oral accounts, images, monuments etc., to which we have no direct experience.”27 Others define
it as “some past episode that can be recounted in a narrative format.”28
Similarly, some scholars contend that historical memory “constructs a common past of a
social community that extends beyond the lifespan of its individual members. Historical memory
imagines a past that reflects the present culture of a social community instead of relating to direct
experience.”29 Indeed, sociologists also show that the terms are in fact different. Collective
memory is generally associated with those who have an experience of an event together while
historical memory is more of a narrative of that experience.
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There is a distinguishing factor about historical memory in that it is two pronged. In one
respect, historical memories are a vehicle in that it is somehow reproduced through a medium.30
The popular term is known as “ars memoriae.”31 Secondly, historical memory appears at random
and is referred to as “vis.”32 This memory arises on its own and is not compelled by any actors. It
is “a force that intrudes upon our mind and can hardly be suppressed.”33
The progression appears to focus on further developing the concept of collective memory
which then merged into the idea of how “specific modes and media of communication and
storage influence or even determine what can be said and remembered.”34 It virtually went from
focusing on social construction in relation to human interaction to construction in the sense of
how the narrative is processed.
The modes of storage are vast. In one recollection, scholars noted that there were
textbooks and architecture to lavish buildings in the olden days. Over time it changed to
commemorating deaths like ceremonies, sites and museums. Education is another area in which
historical memories are often narrated.
While the field of memory in general is centuries old, most of the studies have emerged
in the 20th century with a focus on collective memory. In many ways it appears that the literature
came to define historical memory by defining collective memory first. It is as if one were to
determine what one is in order to determine what the other is not, thereby determining the
concept of historical memory.
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POLITICS OF MEMORY OR MEMORY POLITICS
“Memory politics” or “politics of memory”35 have emerged as monikers for the political
science subfield of study. For quite some time, memory was considered an unlikely factor to
Examine—one that was delegated to historians. Moreover, political scientists had difficulty
conceptualizing how memory would be measured or operationalized. Indeed the near nonexistence of this study in the field indicated the absence of such inquiries.36
At the genesis, scholars began by exploring historical memory in relation to government
transitions. Particularly in light of the upsurge of governments changing to democracies, memory
became another aspect to examine. The literature evolved by gauging memory in relation to the
state, civil society and the individual, particularly in respect to the utility of memory as a tool.37
Individuals are primarily assessed to determine the extent to which they are aware that
memory is being utilized and how their sense of nationalism is cultivated. 38 Civil society is
examined in relation to what role it plays in curating historical memory. States have been
assessed for their ability to maintain a historical narrative, utilize history as a leverage point in
everyday politics, identify as a victim and build national identity and so much more. 39 Historical
memories can be “reshaped in relation to the present historical-political moment” or “be
aggressive purveyors of national memory.”40
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Unlike those in history or other fields, political scientists are not in the business of
contesting accuracy of past events but, rather, they assess how history is utilized in present-day
politics. History
provides us with a vantage point, not for recovering or discovering the past but for
entering into a dialogue with. Remembering in this sense conceives of history not as a
constraint on the present but rather as a compelling moment for crucial viewpoints to be
constructed for critical purposes. History, therefore, becomes a source of imaginative
power.41
Studies have circumvented whether or how the state is controlling a historical narrative,
the extent to which it is a political resource, its attempt to exploit some aspect and, lastly, its
political leverage.42 Indeed, how is history being manipulated or changed for present-day
politics? To what end is it being utilized in this manner?
Gambles distinguishes two different but interrelated forms of forgetting: “conscious state
forgetting and unconscious social forgetting. State forgetting is the deliberate silencing of a
particular part of the past for political purposes. The state can also act as an initiator and
facilitator of social forgetting instead of "a gradual, collective loss of interest in a part of the past
that conveys an undesired self-image."”43
Scholars have recognized three main tracks for how history is used. First, memory is
utilized as a tool. Perhaps Palmberger said it best, “it is a question of power who is able to lead
the public discourse and decides which memories to ban and which to promote.”44 Secondly, the
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field appears to examine the relationship between memory and identity from national, regional
and supranational identities.45 Third, there is the consideration of whether individuals and civil
society members are aware of what is happening.46
Within those tracks, two other subsections have emerged. First, some scholars ask why
are memory politics occurring at all. Pierre Nora contends, “the nation as a foundation of identity
eroded as the state ceded power to society. The nation itself, earlier shored up by memory, now
appears as a mere memory trace.”47 It is the idea that memory no longer plays the same role that
it did in the past, and thus to fill that void states are now having to “represent and invent what we
can no longer spontaneously experience.”48
Secondly, some ask what is propelling the field? What is the catalyst that is driving these
studies in one direction or another? Olick contends that there was a relationship between the
nation and memory harking back to the 19th century, but that the relationship changed.49 Political
developments over time have helped to actuate the field. Specifically, they include “the increase
of redress claims, the rise of identity politics, a politics of victimization and regret, and an
increased willingness of governments to acknowledge wrongdoing, as well as the breakdown of
repressive regimes that have left difficult legacies behind.”50 Overall, there are numerous frames
of reference and mechanisms in which to examine memory and history. In this study we have
selected the lens of politics.
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EAST ASIA’S MEMORY PROBLEM
East Asia is marked by what many call the “memory problem.” Others call it the War of
Resistance against Japan, memory war and even a clash of histories. The tenure of East Asia’s
persistence in retelling the past has been considered highly unorthodox. While a great debate in
international relations dialogue circle around the rise of China, some scholars have recognized
the significance of historical memory and the role it plays in the region.
Gerrit Gong argues that there is a resurgence in what he refers to as the “clash of
histories.” Traumatic events are sometimes remembered and also sometimes forgotten. In
examining cases around the world, Gong contends that there is much to be resolved in Asia in
regard to history. While some regions are still impacted by historical matters, others have
reconciled history.
Asia, on the other hand, shows hyperawareness on this topic to this day. Although the
region is facing numerous challenges, at the core it appears to be these historical events causing
the problems. The past is significant in terms of its influence on the development of national
identity and perception.
External influence is also present by way of other countries.51 For instance, China and
Korea have been putting pressure on Japan in regard to their historical memory. Other actors
include what Lebow refers to as “nongovernmental keepers of collective memories.”52 These
actors are those who form formal and informal networks and collaborate with governments, to
international organizations and even individuals.
Why has the historical memory war continued in East Asia, outpacing other regions and
historical examples? Indeed, what should be long overdue has continued to permeate the news,
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scholarly literature and discourse to this day. The international studies field has recognized this
as an ongoing and complex puzzle. In an effort to add to the greater question of why states are
doing this, I believe it is important to discover the how.
MAINTAINING THE NARRATIVE
Within this subfield, the literature focuses on four strands of questions. How is history
being maintained? Who is maintaining the story? Why is the story being maintained? Finally,
what is the narrative that is being told? For this dissertation I will focus on the state as the actor
and their ability to maintain a historical narrative.
Scholars have identified several factors: language, infrastructure or commemoration and
symbolism. Language has been a resourceful strategy for keeping history alive and for it to be
used to inform future generations. The research has primarily examined history textbooks that
are utilized within a country’s domestic education system, to speeches.
School textbooks have been examined in Japan in relation to how they integrate history in
terms of the Asia-Pacific war. Japan has been identified as a state that does not have a state-run
textbook publication, however it does have guidelines for publishers.53 The crux of the matter is
that China and South Korea feel that Japan does not accurately portray their actions in World
War II. Hundt and Bleiker noted how South Korea argues that Japan does not portray the
brutality of the Imperial army in its textbooks.54
The textbook controversy circles around four main dates. The first is in 1982 when the
Ministry of Education asked that the word “invasion” be changed with the word “advance.”55
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This caused great outrage from China and South Korea. In 1986 the book Shinpen Nihonshi had
a lot of revisions that had to be corrected.56 Again, China and South Korea responded with
animosity.
In 2001 the Japanese Society for History Textbook reform was created. This organization
sought to present history in a more positive light. They believe that Japan is the “emancipator of
Asia.”57 South Korea reacted with street demonstrations and campaigned against Japan’s desire
to obtain a seat on the United Nations Security Council.58 South Korea also temporarily removed
the Japanese ambassador to Korea.
In 2005 another book by Tsukurukai was approved by Japan’s Ministry of Education.
There were phrases and texts that again brought up controversy from China and South Korea.
South Korea even submitted 35 passages with edit recommendations and two were accepted.59
While much of the debate in the field has examined specific historical facts and how they
are conveyed by Japan to its citizens, few have considered whether the history textbooks have an
impact on society and how they are regarded. Fukuoka conducted a study by interviewing
Japanese students and utilized Schudson’s five dimensions of retrievability, rhetorical force,
resonance, institutional retention and resolution.60 His study revealed that history textbooks in
Japan are more factual and read like an encyclopedia with less analysis components.
Perhaps one reason is the strenuous standard national entrance exams in Japan which are
used for students to compete to get into the top high schools and universities in the country. The
exam is conducted through multiple choice and short answer questions that are generally driven
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by memorization of facts. One student interviewee stated that history textbooks are not really
utilized for these exams and thus emphasis is not placed on them as much. Further, most of what
is taught in school usually focuses on history that goes way back and not contemporary history
such as the twentieth century.
Some history teachers, one student remarked, never got to the 1930s by the end of the
school year. Most of what is taught was from centuries ago. At the same time the students had
various experiences that appeared to be contingent upon geographical locations. For instance,
one student who lived in Hiroshima had a history teacher who was passionate about the topic and
brought in more information and arguments than the history textbooks provided.
Overall, it appears that some teachers are hesitant to bring in their own right or left wing
perspective while some are perfectly adept at doing so. Based on survey results, the students do
not appear to think that much influence is given to history textbooks. They feel that the
government has influence there and certainly other country’s textbooks, such as in South Korea
and China, must have their own government’s influence so perhaps both sides are biased.
Information about the past is gathered through other sources like media and movies.
The author argues that perhaps history textbooks play a much smaller role than is
suspected by some. He further asks, “have history textbook controversies been misplaced?”61 In
other respects, one scholar noted how a professor sued the Ministry of Education for editing his
historical textbook to make it less controversial. They eliminated words such as aggression and
colonization.62
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Speeches and government statements have been analyzed by scholars. Japan released a
Postwar Fifty Year Resolution that acknowledged its actions in the past and noted that it deeply
regretted its actions.63 Other Asian countries found the apology to be less than heartfelt.
Barak Kushner examined the ownership of historical memory and how it was being
manipulated by focusing on the unofficial and official presses of Japan and China.64 In other
areas the debate about why the narrative is being maintained has circled around the topic of
politics. Many scholars suspect that the primary reason such historical memories are being
maintained is in regard to the advantage of politics. Guoqi highlights the victimization complex
that is taking place in China, which the Communist Party is utilizing for its benefit towards Japan
and Taiwan.65 Reilly points out that China has benefits to gain from garnering domestic support
from its citizens to overall political benefits.66 Kristof notes that Japan also considers political
gain as the reason that China and South Korea continue to bring up history.67
GAP IN THE LITERATURE
The historical memory field in relation to East Asia has focused on four main segments.
How are historical narratives being told and who is telling the story? Why are historical
narratives maintained and what history is being retold? For this dissertation I will focus on how
the narrative is being maintained.
At the methodological standpoint, case studies in general have been increasing in
frequency in the political science field. However, in relation to the study of memory it is still in
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its infancy stage. Further, there are few studies that have provided a comprehensive overview of
several states. To that end, I will contribute to the literature by adding a case study methodology
inclusive of China, Japan and South Korea and their efforts in maintaining a historical narrative.
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CHAPTER III
CHINA
INTRODUCTION
The early twentieth century was marked by a struggle for power between the communist
and nationalist parties. To add to the quandary, an external threat was attempting to usurp
national power by invading and infiltrating the nation.1 Japan was on a path of imperialist gain.
The two parties recognized that there was a greater external threat that needed to be eradicated.
Working in unison, the two factions worked to overthrow Japanese ambition. Following their
mutual victory, the communist and nationalist party resumed in civil war once more with the
present day communist party emerging as the victor.2
The inability to reconcile the past has caused tumultuous relations between China, Japan
and South Korea. To date, the bilateral relations have not always been turbulent. There were
periods of peace over the twentieth century as domestic and international settings evolved. The
Cold War helped to alleviate some historical animosity with the attention being shifted towards
an external, and even greater, threat. Such threats revolved around the potential spread of
communism, US-Soviet struggle for power and nuclear war.3 Somewhat similar to diversionary
war theory, outside factors precluded the need to resolve internal historical debates for some
time. Overall, we argue that China’s efforts in maintaining their historical narrative has been
relatively consistent in the past decade.
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REMEMBERING HISTORY
While the Chinese Communist party (CCP) formed back in 1921, it did not gain national
influence until 1949.4 Recognizing the significance of commemoration, the Chinese Constitution
states, “The State protects sites of scenic and historical interest, valuable cultural monuments and
relics and other significant items of China’s historical and cultural heritage.”5
As the communist party regained control in the 1940s, they sought ways to consolidate
their power and control the citizenry.6 The government made grand efforts to publicize to ensure
that the citizens were aware of the martyr. They considered an approach that was twofold, one is
to assist with the bereavement of those who passed and secondly it was to formulate it to their
advantage. In 1950 the government defined a martyr as someone
who died a heroic death in one of the following seven historical conflicts: the 1911
Revolution opposing Manchu rule; the Northern Expedition from 1924 to 1927; the
national revolutionary war of 1927-1937; the resistance against Japanese aggression in
1930s; the War of Resistance against Japan from 1937 to 1945; the War of Liberation
against the Kuomintang; and, finally, all individuals who perished while incarcerated by
imperialists and reactionaries during these historical periods.7
This time period brought forth strong support from the government as the utility of
having martyrs was recognized. At times, China has commemorated war-time figures such as
General Zhang Zizhong. He was a high level official during the early twentieth century.
General Zhang Zizhong, commander of the eight divisions that constituted
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the Chinese 33rd Army Group, was killed at approximately 4:00 P.M. on May 16, 1940,
in fighting at Shilichangshan ('Ten li mountain') near Nanguadian in Northern Hubei. The
battle was one engagement of the Zaoyang-Yichang campaign that rumbled through
late spring of that year. Surrounded by the Japanese, his forces had refused either to
retreat or to surrender. In the ensuing hand-to-hand combat, General Zhang had been
wounded seven times in all, by grenade, bullet, and finally by bayonet. The victorious
Japanese realized Zhang's identity only when a major discovered, in the left breast
pocket of his blood-soaked yellow uniform, a fine gold pen engraved with his name. The
major quickly summoned senior officers; they ordered a stretcher brought and the body
was carried away from the battlefield. (This was observed, through half-opened eyes, by
Zhang's long-time associate, the Chinese major Ma Xiaotang, who lay nearby, bleeding
from a bayonet wound, and who later gasped out the story to Chinese as he died).8
For China, this figure has been memorialized in history and has assisted the Chinese
government in procuring “patriotic sentiment.”9 At that time, his death was viewed as a loss for
both political parties. However, this was not always the case, as there were time periods when
General Zhang was forgotten such as during the period of leadership by Mao. In relation to
political advantages, there were numerous benefits such as the ability
to divert attention from the destruction of war; to legitimize armed conflict as a means of
fighting enemies; to comfort the bereaved and help them cope with personal loss; to help
heal collective psychic wounds; and finally, to educate future generations, thus serving,
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in the words of Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), “to commemorate the dead and inspiring the
living.”10
The party honored such martyrs through public ceremonies and established a national
cemetery that is called the “Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery.”11 This cemetery is located on
the western side of the city of Beijing and has been in place since 1949. While the cemetery
exists as a resting ground for martyrs, leaders and other officials, it also is a place where a lot of
commemoration takes place. An annual event is held honoring the martyrs and continues today.
Other public instruments included the creation of cemeteries, memorial halls, holidays,
and trials. At times, the individuals who passed also were memorialized through their life stories
being published in books.
In 1950 the Communist Party insisted that various officials would attend the festival
annually to honor those who have passed. The festival did not only take place in one location but
it was replicated in different cities throughout China on the same day.
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS
Mao Zedong once rebuked an apology from a Japanese prime minister for what occurred
during the early twentieth century war—instead he thanked him. He thanked Prime Minister
Tanaka for Japan’s actions as it “destroyed the Kuomintang” and helped the Communist Party
come to power.12 In the early twentieth century, China was embroiled in a civil war between the
Kuomintang and the Communist Party. For a short time, the parties collaborated to defeat the
imperial Japanese, who were accosting their nation. After the defeat of Japan, the civil war
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resumed once more between the two parties. The Communist Party emerged as the victor while
the Kuomintang moved to what is now Taiwan.
Zedong’s remarks are in stark comparison to the current debate about whether Japan’s
apology about the early twentieth century is sufficient or even genuine.13 In the span of 65 years,
China has teetered from accepting Japan’s apologies to seeking a more satisfactory one. Indeed,
China has been accused of having “benevolent amnesia” prior to 1982, with a steady rise of
historical remembrance leading to a turnabout in 2005.14 In total, Japan is said to have proffered
25 apologies over the years, most notably with the Murayama statement.15
China’s inability to accept Japan’s apology has resulted in a long-standing historical
debate. At the core, China considers the apology to be disingenuous, citing Japan’s inaccurate
depiction of past events in history textbooks to their leadership’s visits to the Yasakuni Shrine.
Japan contends that they have offered apologies in the past and China is continuing this debate
for ulterior reasons ranging from party validation, to rise of domestic nationalism, to efforts to
monopolize the region.
Extensive commentary and scholarly works evolve around China’s present day narrative
of their past incursions with Japan. The “past” is in reference to the second Sino-Japanese War of
1937-1945, alternatively called the War of Anti-Japanese Resistance.16
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Through the years, Sino-Japanese relations gradually improved. Indeed, less than 30
years later, bilateral relations normalized in 1972 with the recognition of one another as
sovereign nations and the term that no war reparations would be sought from Japan.17
In recent times, bilateral relations have been rocky. Detractors from the historical
memory debate often contest the validity of segments of the second Sino-Japanese war such as
the Rape of Nanjing18 and Comfort Women. The majority of these individuals are scholars, civil
society members and, sometimes, politicians.
In a longstanding textbook controversy, China argues that Japan tends to glaze over their
role and actions in the second Sino-Japanese war. China posits that future Japanese citizens will
be ignorant of the past, of the crimes they committed and that the country could instigate future
problems. There is also concern that Japan could rise militarily once more. On their part, Japan
contests the textbook controversy as an internal matter that should not be interceded upon by
outside states.
In other areas, the Yasakuni Shrine was never contested until the mid-1970s when the 13
class A war criminals were added. China argues that the shrine visits indicate that Japan is still
not remorseful of the past if its citizens are able to visit this sanctum. For Japan, they view it as a
way to pay respects for those who served their nation.
To add to the complexity of the matter, other factors are considered pertinent such as
China’s economic and military advancement, their efforts to usurp regional power, to bilateral
territorial disputes. Japan’s recent slight economic decline, and consideration of constitutional
changes to provide military aid in the event of emergencies, has been impactful. Both sides cite
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concern about one another’s intent and ambitions. Indeed, some could even argue that this
historical memory debate is a strategy for the states to posture for power in the region.
CHINA’S POLITICAL RHETORIC
As one of the foremost clandestine nations, China is notoriously secretive and selective in
the information and data that it provides to the world.19 In recent years, the nation has been
embroiled in a war with Google20 and netizens who attempt to thwart the system. Coupled with
international scrutiny, 21 China has built a reputation that still manages to maintain a stronghold
over its domestic Internet and media.
The study of China’s political rhetoric has come with limitations. Unlike Japan and South
Korea, China does not possess a single database that contains the speeches of its president. One
database was located, despite the fact that it did not appear to be comprehensive. A copious
number of speeches have been translated into English, however I recognize that phrasing and
terminology may not always infer the original meaning that was intended behind the words.
Further, I must also assume that some speeches have not been translated into English. I did my
best in ensuring that I captured as many speeches as I could possibly find. Lastly, I would also
conjecture that there are some internal presidential party speeches that may never be revealed.
THE JINTAO ERA
Hu Jintao served as the sixth president of the People’s Republic of China from 20032013.22 At the inception of his term, Japan already had Prime Minister Koizumi in place since
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2001. With an election pledge that he would annually visit the Yasakuni Shrine should he be
elected,23 Koizumi kept his word during his entire term from 2001-2006.24 A commemoration
site in Japan, the Yasakuni Shrine holds a great deal of controversy for Japan’s neighboring
states. It is said to house the spirits of over 2.5 million people who died in combat for their
country with the inclusion of the highly controversial “14 convicted Class A war criminals.”25
These war criminals were found guilty of “committing war crimes and crimes against humanity”
by the International Military Tribunal with regard to WWII.26
During the three overlapping years between Jintao’s and Koizumi’s times in office, the
Yasakuni Shrines would prove to be a thorn that would diminish bilateral relations. The
ramifications of those visits were poignant, as marked by cancelled bilateral meetings and
summit meetings with both China and South Korea. While occasional visits continued from high
officials from each country, the overall strain of these visits dampened bilateral relations
considerably.
In a rare opportunity, both Jintao and Koizumi attended the 2004 Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation meeting, and in a side meeting Jintao stressed,27
To treat history appropriately is the only way to translate historical burden into power of
moving ahead. Currently the root cause for the difficulties of bilateral political relations is
the visit of Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine. We hope that Japan can handle this
problem properly. The longer the problem exists, the greater hurt it will bring to the
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feeling of the Chinese people and the people of all nations who suffered from Japanese
aggression and the worse it is for the improvement and development of bilateral relations.
Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future. Japanese leaders should take a
responsible attitude to the history and its people and proceed from the long-lasting
friendly relations between China and Japan and the overall trend of peace and
development in Asia to properly handle related problems and protect bilateral ties from
damages which should have been avoided. The Chinese people always believe that in that
tragic war the Japanese people including those soldiers who were forced to fight the war
and lost their lives are also victims, but they detest the criminals who launched the war.
When considering the issue of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, the Japanese leaders must
take into account the feeling of the people of the victim countries and the overall situation
of China-Japan friendly relations.28
After Koizumi’s 2015 visit to the shrine, China responded by canceling a meeting with a
Japanese envoy. While Jintao did not provide any public remarks, his ambassador to Japan,
Wang Yi, expressed great concern. He cited it as “a grave provocation to the Chinese people.”29
Li Zhaoxing, China’s foreign minister, encouraged Wang to pledge a diplomatic protest to
Tokyo.
In an even more controversial move, Koizumi visited the shrine on August 15 in his last
year in office, the second such visit on that date in history.30 The date’s significance rises from it
being the anniversary of the day Japan surrendered after World War II.31 While it would
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normally have incited a feverish response from China and South Korea, as Koizumi was about to
depart from office a month later, their responses were considered mild.32 Indeed, China
responded with a statement on its foreign minister’s website, stating “We strongly protest against
an action that has greatly hurt the feelings of the victims of Japanese military aggression and
destroyed the political foundation of the China-Japan relationship.”33
While the Yasakuni Shrine visit controversy is not new, at the time it escalated regional
tensions to a new height by inciting protests and riots in China and nearby states. As Koizumi’s
term came to an end in 2006, Jintao would see four other individuals serve as Japan’s prime
minister with Koizumi being the only prime minister to visit the Yasakuni Shrine.
The height of China and Japan’s bilateral relations came two years after Koizumi’s
departure. Jintao’s 2008 five-day tour of Japan in which he highly espoused the need for future
cooperation culminated in a six-point statement of agreement.34 Indeed, his 2008 visit to Japan
was the first for a Chinese president in a decade.35 It was dubbed the “warm spring trip.”36
Improved economic relations, peaceful measures of negotiation, and increased efforts to
maintain and grow trust were just a few of the negotiations.37
During the trip, Jintao visited Waseda University where he told a story of how the two
nations were once close friends but the turn of tides came when Japan invaded China. He
recognized that many suffered on both sides, and declared “the reason that we keep on
emphasizing on not forgetting the history is not to continue enmity, but to take the history as the
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mirror, face the future, cherish and maintain peace, keep the friendship from generation to
generation and let the people in the world have lasting peace.”38
Toward the end of his term, the relations with Japan turned sour once more. Japan’s
acquisition attempt of the islands by purchasing them caused an uproar in China in 2012. During
an Asia-Pacific summit, Jintao stated that China will not consider a purchase of the islands to be
valid.39 A commemorative event that was planned in advance to mark “40 years of diplomatic
relations” was cancelled.40
Overall, Jintao’s term was relatively in flux with regard to his remarks with Japan. It was
often mired by domestic events at the time ranging from the Yasakuni Shrine visits to the island
debate. Perhaps what differentiates Jintao most from Xinping is his overall reference of the past.
He makes statements alluding to the past whereas Xinping often speaks directly about the past.
At the outset, Jintao’s term proves to be similar to China’s overall history of accepting and
revoking Japan’s apology. Overall, Sino-Japanese relations started out poor, improved during the
midterm years and fell towards the end once more.
XI JINPING
Two months prior to becoming president, Xi Jinping stated, “the tide of history is mighty.
Those who follow it will prosper, while those who resist it will perish. Looking back on history,
we can see that those who launched aggression or sought expansion by force all ended in failure.
This a law of history.”41
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In his presidential term thus far, patriotism is identified as an important component to the
nation, both to the party and to the public. Secondly, his attitude toward South Korea appears to
resonate on a common experience as victims of Japan’s aggressions. Third, while he has stated
the need to forgive those who are responsible for the war, in other speeches, he has continuously
stressed the need to never forget the past and for Japan to not conceal history.
PATRIOTISM
Jinping is often found referring to history and the past as mirrors to the future. At the
inception of his term he made a speech to leading officials at all levels, espousing the need to
study the history of both the party and the country and remain patriotic and dedicated. “History is
the best textbook, so studying it will teach us to understand the country and the party, and open
the gates to a brighter future.”42
In a March 2013 speech, he remarked, “we should consolidate and develop the broadest
possible patriotic united front, strengthen our party’s unity and cooperation with other political
parties and personages without party affiliation.”43 On other occasions he remained intent on
reemphasizing the term. He maintained, “we need to use the national spirit of patriotism and
spirit of the times.”44 In yet another speech, he remarked, “my hope for Chinese students and
scholars studying abroad—I hope you will adhere to patriotism. China’s history stretches over
thousands of years, patriotism has always been a stirring theme and powerful force inspiring
Chinese of all ethnic groups to carry on and excel.”45
Indeed, Xinping has made a concerted effort to address the broad public with declarations
to both the young and old. That same month, he told a story about how
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During the war of resistance against Japanese aggression, captain Gregory Kurishenko of
the air force of the soviet union came to China and fought side by side with the Chinese
people. He once said, I feel the Chinese people’s sufferings as if I were feeling the
sufferings of my own motherland. He died heroically on Chinese soil. The Chinese
people will never forget this hero. An ordinary Chinese mother and her son have kept
vigil at his tomb for more than half a century.46
In December of 2013, he remarked,
We should disseminate the glorious history and excellent culture of the Chinese nation
and people. Enhance education in patriotism, collectivism, socialism with the help of all
possible means, such as classroom teaching, theoretical research, historical study, films
and television programs, literary works, help our people build up and persist in a correct
concept of history, national viewpoint, state outlook, cultural perspective.47
In February 2014, he once again highlighted patriotism, “We should work hard to absorb
the philosophical and moral essence of traditional Chinese culture, foster and disseminate our
national character with patriotism at the core.”48 That same month, Jinping highlighted Japanese
aggression to their fellow Taiwanese compatriots.49
In a more explicit September speech, Xi remarked about the need
for the Chinese people to carry on the national spirit of the Anti-Japanese War as the
country is expecting many ‘great battles’ in its future development … The great national
spirit, with patriotism at its core, was a decisive factor for the victory.50
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His remarks signify the level of importance placed on patriotism and instilling such sentiment in
the public.
NEVER FORGET
In December 2014, at the anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, Jinping remarked,
We should not bear hatred against an entire nation just because a small minority of
militarists launched aggressive war. The responsibilities for war crimes lie with a few
militarists, but not the people.51
A year later, Jinping attended the China-Japan friendship exchange meeting and
stated,
in spirit of taking history as a mirror and looking into the future and on basis of four
political documents between China and Japan, jointly promote peaceful development, etc.
2000 years of peace and friendship in the hearts of the two peoples. China attaches great
importance to the development of China-Japan relations. 70th anniversary of the victory
of Chinese People’s War of resistance against Japanese aggression. Any attempt to distort
and beautify the history of Japanese militaristic aggression will not be tolerated by the
Chinese people or the people of other victimized Asian countries. It is believable that any
Japanese people with a sense of justice and conscience will not tolerate it either. Past
experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future. To remember history is meant to
create the future; to never forget the war is meant to maintain peace. The Japanese people
are also victims of that war.52
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In two remarkable statements, he admitted that the people of Japan were not to blame but
that the perpetrators who instigated the war are the true adversaries. It is a rare admission that
we have not seen since the days when Mao Zedong rebuked an apology from a Japanese prime
minister in regard to the past.
However, much of Jinping’s remarks in between have indicated this clear need to
maintain the historical memory and to always remember history. In a March 2014 speech, he
remarked, “The war of aggression against China waged by Japanese militarism alone inflicted
over 35 million Chinese military and civilian casualties. These atrocities remain fresh in our
memory.”53
In February 2014, Jinping highlighted the similar aggression that Taiwan faced by the
Japanese,
a hundred and twenty years ago China was a weak country and the Japanese aggressors
took advantage of this to occupy Taiwan. This was a traumatic experience for all Chinese
people on both sides of the straits. In the bitter years when Taiwan was under Japanese
occupation, countless compatriots shed their blood and many laid down their lives,
proving they were inseparable members of the extended family of the Chinese nation…
We identify with our compatriots in Taiwan in terms of their historical trauma, for it is a
shared trauma of all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation.54
For the first time in history, China’s president attended a commemoration ceremony on
the date of Japan’s defeat at which he remarked about how the Chinese people survived the
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aggressive acts of Japan at the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against
Japanese Aggression.55
September 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the end of the War of Resistance against
Chinese Aggression and was celebrated widely by the Chinese government. Jinping made
remarks at a ceremony highlighting the momentous event in history. He highlighted the efforts of
the people who fought during that war and the international support—the war symbolized the
difference between “justice and evil, light and darkness.” Jinping further mentioned the point of
the commemoration ceremony as three fold, “bear history in mind, honor all those who laid
down their lives, cherish peace, and open up the future.”56
In time, Jinping became more direct regarding his speeches on China. He has spoken
about the “aggression of Japanese militarists” in speeches with other countries such as the U.S.
During a visit to the U.S., he remarked about the recent anniversary of the War of Resistance
against Japanese Aggression.
An important lesson history teaches us is that peaceful development is the right path,
while any attempt to seek domination or hegemony through force is against the historical
trend and doomed to failure. The Chinese recognized as early as 2,000 years ago that
though a country is now strong, varicosity will lead to its ruling. China’s defense policy
is defensive in nature and its military strategy features active defense. Let me reiterate
here that no matter how developed it could become, China will never seek hegemony or
engage in expansion.57

55

Celia Hatton, "Is Xi Jinping Trying to Provoke Anger against Japan?," (BBC News: BBC News, 2014).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Full Text of Chinese President's Speech at
Commemoration of 70th Anniversary of War Victory," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of
China, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/chinas-xi-jinpings-speech-commemoration-70th-anniversaryjapanese-wwii-surrender.
57
GeekWire, "Full Text from President Xi Jinping's Speech," National Commitee on U.S. China Relations,
https://www.ncuscr.org/content/full-text-president-xi-jinpings-speech.
56

45
At the March 26, 2015 Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference, Xi Jinping remarked once
again about the great War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.
In another presidential first, Jinping made an appearance at a ceremony highlighting the
Marco Polo Bridge incident.58 This event sparked the beginning of the war and was instigated by
Japan. Xinping remarked, “No one can revise history and truth. Chinese people who made great
sacrifices [during the war] would never allow anyone to play down [Japan’s] wartime
atrocities.”59
Jinping has publicly mentioned that Japan’s people are not to blame and yet he has
continued this historical narrative in remembering history. His second point has been to ascertain
that history is not to be altered by any state.
SOUTH KOREA
On July 4, 2014 Jinping visited Seoul National University to emphasize the goodwill
between the two nations. Most of all, Jinping mentioned the commonality between the two states
with Japan’s historical acts of aggression.60
He highlighted the “barbarous” acts of the Japanese61 and the turmoil that so many
endured during the times that Japan was the perpetrator to both China and South Korea.62 He
pointed out that “When the war against Japan was at its highest pitch, the Chinese and Korean
people shared their suffering and helped each other with sweat and blood.”63
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He further elaborated on the concerns about the rising sense of nationalism in Japan.
Japan has made attempts to move on from the past and both nations have had difficulty accepting
it. Further, Japan has now made a move to allow some of their national troops abroad which has
instilled further concerns that the nation may become more militaristic.
Perhaps in an effort to further foster an alliance with South Korea, Jinping has appealed
to the public. Others contend that China is merely trying to maintain a balance of power in the
region. Overall, China’s approach has been fairly consistent in its rhetoric toward Japan. The
point of never forgetting the past and not altering history has been maintained. Somewhat
dissimilar to Jintao, Jinping has openly stated that those who are to be blamed have long since
passed.
COMMEMORATION
History is indeed highly utilized in China with its grand efforts to commemorate through
the formation of monuments, museums and holidays. Commemoration is an ancient method of
memorializing the past. Often, it is in reference to ancestors or others who have passed and
includes holidays, rituals, monuments and museums.64 Commemoration is further defined this
way:
[Commemoration] refers to all those devices through which a nation recalls, marks,
embodies, discusses or argues about its past, and to all those devices which are intended
to create or sustain a sense of belonging or “we feeling” in the individuals who belong to
it, a sense of belonging which may or may not provide for a means of addressing future
tasks and possibilities. Commemoration, then, includes public rituals of remembrance
and individual acts of recollection, the building of monuments and dedication of places of
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memory, the construction of museums and the naming of streets, the visiting of such
places, public debates over the meaning and significance of historical events, and the
unspoken or gestural ways through which nationality is not so much represented as
incorporated in the practices of everyday life.65
MUSEUMS
The number of museums have risen and fallen over the past century. At the premiere of
Communist Party control, only 25 museums existed in the country.66 Later, that number rose,
only to be demolished once again during the preeminent “Cultural Revolution.”67
In recent years China’s museums have been on the rise once again. The government has
made great efforts to expand the number of such buildings in the thousands by 2015. The
national government has provided extensive funding.
Some of the more notable museums that have commemorated history include the Longhua
Martyrs Memorial Park, Yuhuatai Memorial Park, Memorial Museum of the People’s Resistance
to Japan, the Hongyan Memorial Hall, Museum of Modern Chinese Literature and the Nanjing
Massacre Memorial Hall.”68
The Memorial Museum of the People’s Resistance to Japan was established in 1987 and
provides visual images and artifacts that reveal the events of the Chinese war against Japan.69
Over 16 million individuals have visited the museum over the years. The Nanjing Massacre
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Memorial Hall was set up in 1985 and is located in Nanjing.70 The hall commemorates the death
of 300,000 individuals and has identified the Japanese acts of aggression. Museum guest
speakers include a survivor of the Massacre Ai Yiying. The hall contains exhibits such as the
bones of victims who have passed.
One author depicts the utility of museums as having political objectives as noted below.
Since the founding of the PRC, such places have been used as tools by the state to
propound officially sanctioned views of modern history. These kinds of museums have
been—and many continue to be—pedagogical tools for the teaching of Party history to
the masses. They embody state power, and this power is expressed at a variety of levels:
the architectural style of museum buildings, the location of museums in the cityscape, the
“authenticity” of concrete artifacts, and the display of those objects and their arrangement
into narratives.71
HOLIDAYS
2014 marked an intriguing year with the creation of two new holidays by the People’s
Republic of China’s government. The National Memorial Day to commemorate the Nanjing
Massacre is set for December 13.72 In its first ceremony ever, there was the signing of the
national anthem to remarks by President Xi. As part of his remarks, he stated,
The state ceremony is to mourn the innocent Nanjing Massacre victims, our compatriots
killed by Japanese invaders and revolutionary martyrs and national heroes who devoted
their lives to win victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.73
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September 3 has been identified as Victory Day for the day China defeated Japan.74 The
first ceremony took place at a museum that centers on the War of Aggression by Japan. While
the focus is certainly on Japan as the perpetrator, the other aspect is the role of the Communist
Party.75
China’s congress previously recognized September 30 as Martyrs Day. Perhaps the most
significant holiday in China is October 1 which is known as National Day. It signifies the day
that China was liberated in 1949 from defeating the Nationalist party by the Communist Party. 76
The holiday has been extended to a week. Annually there is a parade and numerous activities to
commemorate the founding of the nation.
MONUMENTS
Beijing, the capital of China, is home to several monuments. The most notable perhaps is
the Monument of the People’s Heroes of 1958, where initial project development began back in
1949. It resides in Tiananmen Square and represents the lost lives of individuals who fought for
China. The monument is a complex statue that depicts many underlying points. Hung argues,
But for the Chinese Communists, the building of a giant memorial in the capital's most
sacred space was more than an act of commemoration. It was a cultural production that
addressed present political needs: affirming thelegitimacy of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), rewriting China’s turbulent history according to a carefully scripted Marxist
text, and establishing the regime’s control over the nation’s collective memory.77
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The long process of determining the image of the monument, the material it is made of
and which direction it would face was all methodically planned. Further, their actions were
publicized through newspaper articles such as the Renmin Ribao to ensure the public was well
aware of its establishment. 78
The monument was a complex project as there was room for eight events to be included;
determining which ones those would be took years of deliberation. Ultimately the following were
chosen:
The Opium War; the Taiping Rebellion; the 1911 Revolution; the May Fourth
Movement; the May Thirtieth Movement of anti-colonial demonstrations in 1925; the
Nanchang Uprising; the War of Resistance against Japan, with an emphasis on the
Communists’ guerrilla warfare; and the Yangzi Crossing by the Red Army in the Civil
War to defeat the Nationalists in south China.79One side of the monument states “eternal
glory to the people’s heroes.”80
Most interestingly, the effort to commemorate the past is cross national. The plight of the
Chinese comfort women is recognized by the South Koreans. In 2015, a statue of a Chinese girl
was erected next to the already-existing statue of a Korean girl.81 Further, China has made efforts
to commemorate South Korean independent activists. In fact, a memorial was erected to honor a
Korean national who killed the Japanese in China.82
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Moreover, China aided South Korea in its efforts to win independence from Japan by
housing its quasi government in Shanghai.83 Back in the day, the site housed Korean
independence fighters where they could continue their cause. The “ROK Provisional
Government” site in China brings visitors from other states.84 South Korean presidents have
visited the site in China over the years.
CEREMONIES
In 2014, China’s President Xi Jinping led a ceremony in remembrance of the Nanjing
Massacre and the 300,000 lives that were sacrificed.85 The ceremony is the first of its kind for
China and it is noted that it is to “promote peace, not prolong hatred.”86 The Nanjing Massacre
took place in 1937 during the occupation by Japan. President Jinping remarked that dislike for a
nation cannot be due to a “small group of militarists who led aggressive wars.”87
CHINA’S PATRIOTIC EDUCATION
As the most populous nation in the world, with over 1.3 billion citizens, the Republic of
China is responsible for educating 18 percent of the world’s population.88 By creed, the state
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establishes and administers schools of various types, universalizes compulsory primary
education and promotes secondary, vocational and higher education as well as pre-school
education.89
The patriotic education campaign is institutionalized through the education system. The
Ministry of Education is tasked with the development of the nine-year compulsory education for
all citizens. One of its missions is “to direct the work of ideology and political education, moral,
physical, health, arts, and national defence education in all types of schools at various levels; and
to direct the construction of the Party in institutions of higher learning.”90
As with most other nations, compulsory education is provided by the government.
The education system has evolved over time with the inclusion of the patriotic education
campaign in 1991. The catalyst for the implementation of this campaign is often identified as the
1989 Tiananmen Square demonstration.91 The Communist Party was reputed to be deeply
alarmed by the incident and concerns about domestic security were at an all-time high.
The incident struck the Communist Party as alarming and discussions ensued regarding
how to mitigate this matter within the masses. Thus, the patriotic education campaign was born.
It was set to emphasize the role of the Communist Party in bringing the country to where it is
today.
Over time, policies were released such as the “Notice About Conducting Education of
Patriotism and Revolutionary Tradition by Exploiting Extensively Cultural Relics” and the
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“General Outline on Strengthening Education on Chinese Modern and Contemporary History
and National Conditions.”92 These edicts were documents that were released from the party to
school administrators and faculty members. The mission of this effort was listed as:
The objectives of conducting the patriotic education campaign are to boost the nation’s
spirit, enhance cohesion, foster national self-esteem and pride, consolidate and develop a
patriotic united front to the broadest extent possible, and direct and rally the masses’
patriotic passions to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.93
Many scholars noted that this was an effort by the leadership to focus once again on the CCP in a
positive light.94
In other areas, textbook authors have been altering their approach on the past. For
instance, with the anti-Japanese war, instead of focusing singularly on the Communist Party
there is a greater scope of examination with a more international outlook.95 However, the history
textbooks still portray the Communist Party in a positive light with hardly any recognition of its
past errors and the turmoil that outside countries have brought to China.
History courses were once considered primarily for middle school but slowly expanded
into the high school curriculum. Along with the change in curriculum there was the development
of “patriotic education bases.”96 In order to further develop the sites, they received financial
support from the government. While the work initiated at the national level, provinces were also
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expected to create some education bases locally as well. Overall, around 100 sites were identified
and students were expected to visit these locations.
Thus, the education efforts of China are two-fold. They include the change in school
curriculum to ensure that the students are learning the current topic. Second, the students would
then visit these education sites which are primarily memorials, museums and places of
commemoration, to further instill what they learned.
“In fact, history education is important to every country, democratic and authoritarian.
History is not just one of the normal subjects at school; it plays an important role in constructing
a nation’s identity and perceptions.”97 China is utilizing its past as a tool through a “patriotic
education campaign,” as noted by Zheng Wang in his article, “National Humiliation, History
Education, and the Politics of Historical memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China.”
The Chinese Communist Party did not limit its work to the education system but also
expanded to other avenues. China has brought forth the education campaign in relation to the
national defense area. A white paper in 2004 noted,
On major holidays, commemoration days and military recruitment occasions, national
defense education is conducted in all parts of China in the form of exhibitions, lectures,
cultural and art performances, knowledge competitions and military summer camps.
Special columns or programs in such media as newspapers, magazines, radio, TV and
web pages are devoted to national defense education. There are now nine provinces and
municipalities that have published newspapers or magazines on national defense
education and more than 30 regions have set up websites on national defense education.
With such platforms like cemeteries of revolutionary martyrs, revolutionary sites, and
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memorial halls and museums which can be used for this purpose, national defense
education has been provided in all parts of the country with nearly 200 million people
educated every year.98
Informing citizens about particular events, values and perspectives is a strategy that the
CCP has been utilizing for some time. While much of it has been to shepherd support for the
Communist party, in other areas it has depicted certain entities as the enemy.
China has faced pushback mostly from Hong Kong in its efforts to impose patriotic
education to the acquired region. An “Occupy Central pro-democracy movement” has sweeped
the city and has brought tension with the main Communist Party.99
Japan and China have had a complex historical past. China’s education system has
depicted Japan as the enemy. One mother notes it best, “The education at school always instils
the idea that Japanese are evil people and if you turn on the television most of the programmes
are about the anti-Japanese war,” Yang Shuilan said. “How can we possibly not resent the
Japanese?”100
THE TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY
Textbooks must be put through an evaluation system with the “State Textbooks
examination and Approval Committee” before they are disseminated to schools nationwide.101
While freedom of the press and speech are noted as rights in the PRC constitution, perhaps this
man says it best, “Quite frankly, in China there are some areas, very sensitive subjects, where it
is impossible to tell people the truth,” said Ge Jianxiong, director of the Institute of Chinese
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Historical Geography at Fudan University in Shanghai and a veteran of official history textbook
advisory committees. "Going very deeply into the history of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and
some features of the Liberation,” as the Communist victory is called, “is forbidden. In China,
history is still used as a political tool, and at the high school level, we still must follow the
doctrine.”102
In relation to Japan, China has had challenges with Japan’s depiction of history starting
with the 1982 textbook controversy.103 Simultaneously with South Korea, the Chinese
government opposed the textbooks in Japan. They felt that Japan brushed over their role in
history.
In 2005 the Japanese ministry approved a new textbook. The work was cited as having
depicted Japan’s role in the war as minimal. Massive demonstrations broke out in 10 different
Chinese cities. In addition, there were an “estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Chinese demonstrators
who marched to the Japanese embassy in Beijing, throwing stones at the building.”
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2005 incident, trilateral history textbooks have been under way between China, South Korea and
Japan in an attempt to help quell the matter.
COMPENSATION
Compensation includes “policies aiming to help victims of past injustices.”105 The
Chinese government also made efforts to compensate those who were deemed martyrs with
financial assistance. There are several policies in place in regard to compensation for martyrs’
families, which include:
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Provisional regulations on preferential treatment for the families of revolutionary martyrs
and revolutionary military service people, provisional regulations on preferential
treatment and compensation for disabled revolutionary service people, provisional
regulations on commendation of and compensation for revolutionary service people who
sacrificed their lives or died of illness, provisional regulations on commendation of and
compensation for injured or killed revolutionary workers.”106
There were government agencies that also provided monetary assistance to the families of
those who passed. Specifically, they would help pay for children’s education as well as assist in
employment positions for family members.107 Martyrs’ families receive financial aid and those
who oppose the Communist Party through the press, or other forms, are persecuted.
While Hung noted the policies that aided those martyrs in the past, another depicts how
the term martyr has evolved over time. For example, martyrs can also be recognized as police
officers who served in China. In 2013 there was the “Children of Martys” who had the
opportunity to visit Russia.108 These children were the offspring of police officers, not warriors
or soldiers who fought in long-gone wars. There were 14 children who embarked on a 10-day
trip that was possible through the funding from China. This annual event has taken place since
2007.
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PUNISHMENT
Punishment includes “perpetrators of injustice as well as policies that restrict freedom
of speech and organization.”109 China is historically known for human right violations. Most
notably, their freedom of speech is well restricted and regulated.
Externally, China has made efforts to portray a more equal rights approach. For
example, under Article 28, the Constitution states,
the State maintains public order and suppresses treasonable and other criminal activities
that endanger State security; it penalizes criminal activities that endanger public security
and disrupt the socialist economy as well as other criminal activities; and it punishes and
reforms criminals.110
In recent times, China has battled Internet censorship. Twitter and Facebook are not
accessible while some other social media forums have been stymied for several months at a
time.111 There has been some frustration on behalf of individual Internet users as well as
companies that rely greatly on the Internet being available. As a result, some companies have
moved to other close-by countries or are currently considering it.
Moreover, the laws have become stricter over time. The Law on Guarding State
Secrets has reportedly been utilized as a method of closing down news stories that may harm the
state.112 It does so under the assumption that it violates or harms national interests. The law states
it is, “for the purpose of guarding state secrets, safeguarding state security and national interests
and ensuring the smooth progress of reform, of opening to the outside world, and of socialist
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construction.”113 Such secrets can range from fields like national defense, economics, science,
technology or the armed forces.114
Media companies have primarily been publicly owned by the state, but a small number
are starting to form privately owned businesses.115 Even with such progress, China is infamous
for its punishment of dissidents or those who oppose the Chinese Communist Party. CPJ reports
that there are 44 journalists imprisoned in China.116
Yang Tongyan is one such case, a freelance writer who was sentenced in 2005 to 12
years for “subverting state authority”—he has not appealed.117 He wrote for various sources like
Boxun News and PEN Center. He also aided Mr. Wenjiang with monetary assistance at a time
when he was recognized as a dissident by China. Yang is still serving his time and his attorney’s
law license was refused for renewal by the national government.
Ekberjan Jamal was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison for recording riots
that occurred in his local region. Jamal’s action of recording was not reprehensible, it was the
fact that he sent those tapes abroad to the Netherlands. Those tapes ended up in the media news
and as a result he was convicted for “splittism-trying to break away from the Communist Party
and revealing state secrets, crimes under Articles 103 and 11 of the Criminal Law.”118
Dissidents like Liu Ziaobo are well known in the international media. He was
sentenced to 11 years for writing articles that were for political reform.119 His articles were also
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released in international media outlets. It was his criticism of the Communist Party that has
brought him such turmoil within his home country, but much praise internationally. In 2010 he
was awarded the Nobel Prize. Ziaobo’s family was further implicated with his wife being held
under house arrest and another family member found guilty of fraud. Many contend that the
conviction was falsely brought forward and was simply a method of threatening the family for
one individual’s actions against the state.120
Restriction is not limited just to individuals, but also to events. For example, the
Tiananmen Square demonstration is one subject that many will not find much information on in
China.
Punishment thus appears to focus on several components consisting of access to
information, individuals who oppose the CCP, certain historical events and there is the time
factor. The time factor refers to periods of time when an important national event is taking place
and thus restrictions became more severe in order to ensure that nothing is overridden.121
The Tiananmen Square demonstrations constitute one such event. The New York Times
reported that months leading up to its anniversary the state cracked down by arresting dissidents.
The concern was that such individuals would bring together a consensus or perhaps another
demonstration.122 Police officers were located in Tiananmen Square and also in the surrounding
area to ensure there was no unrest. There is fear for some in regard to openly discussing the past
and what the demonstration stood for. It could incite arrests and turmoil for some.
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INFORMATION CONTROL
China is ranked 176th out of 180 countries worldwide by Reporters without Borders.123
It is internationally recognized for its limitations on freedom of speech and freedom of
expression. The state exclusively controls what information enters the country through Internet
control, to what information is disseminated to the public.
On one level, citizens are limited in relation to what website and portals they have
access to as well as social media sites. The state has monitoring and control devices on the
national web portals to ensure compliance. Certain terminology or events cannot be searched,
such as “Tiananmen Square.”
On a secondary level, the state controls what information is disseminated by media
outlets. From web media to radio, communication is highly controlled and censored. The state
determines what can be written about and what cannot. Journalists have been killed, questioned
by authorities or have disappeared. One of the famous incarcerated journalists is Gao Yu, who
leaked a party document entitled “ten perils to combat,” noting media independence as one of the
sources.124
CONCLUSION
As an authoritarian nation, China continues to maintain its stronghold on all media
outlets. The lack of individual rights and freedom of expression has allowed the government to
dictate its historical narratives. In all facets of life, China controls the message through rhetoric,
education, commemoration, compensation and punishment. It is clear that the nation continues to
maintain a streamlined approach to Japan’s attempt to moderate history.
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CHAPTER IV
SOUTH KOREA
INTRODUCTION
Nearly a century ago, Japan invaded the Republic of Korea in 1910 and colonized the
nation up until 1945. The brutal occupation by Japan still stirs present-day hostilities and
contention. In the twenty-first century, Japan’s leadership has proffered multiple apologies to
South Korea for its pastime actions. While the nation has recognized some remarks, it has also
criticized some attempts as lacking in remorse.
To add to the furor, Japanese politicians have continued to make “blunders” that stir up
historical hostilities.1 At times, Japanese politicians have questioned the authenticity and facts of
past events such as the comfort women. Others even argue that Japan helped South Korea to
become the nation it is today.
To date, such bilateral relations have vacillated between friendliness and animosity.
Although economic interdependence and security threats have brought these two nations
together, for all that they have in common, the present-day projection of the past is contested. As
allies of the U.S., the historical matter has proven to be a challenge in their bilateral relations.
This chapter will examine how South Korea has maintained the narrative of the past by
looking at its efforts in rhetoric, commemoration, education, compensation and punishment. The
three primary points of contention include the comfort women, history textbooks and shrine
visits.
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REMEMBERING HISTORY
Korea has often been ensconced between Sino-Japanese power skirmishes due to its
geographic location between the two nations. The nation’s sovereignty was often threatened by
those who viewed it for their own national gain as well as a path to imperialist gain. Such
bilateral skirmishes date back to 1592 when the Japanese military invaded Korea to eliminate
many royal palaces.
It was not until the 1860s when Japan’s power grew over the region.2 In time, they came
to influence Korea and with the conclusion of the 1905 war between Russia and Japan, Korea
became a colony five years later. The colonial period was marked by Japan’s efforts to eradicate
the Korean culture and history. It banned the Korean language, citizens were given Japanese
names and the Japanese culture was forced on the Koreans.3 Numerous Korean women were
coerced or kidnapped into becoming comfort women at stations throughout the region.4 Serving
as sex slaves, many perished, and there are only a small number of survivors today. Thirty-five
years later with the conclusion of World War II, the country regained its independence.
Following the end of colonization, Korea was subsequently bifurcated into two nations.
With the Soviets taking over the North and the U.S. controlling the South, the two nations
morphed into divergent forms of government. In the following years, an incident where North
Korea attacked South Korea launched the Korean War.5 A 1953 ceasefire brought the war into a
standstill.6
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With the end of the Korean War, South Korea focused on rebuilding the nation. Ruled by
autonomous leaders for several decades, the nation rarely examined history. For the majority of
the time there were greater external threats to consider, a communist North Korea, the Cold War,
and domestic efforts to root out communism and grapple with economic struggles. Any historical
discussion from 1945-1965 revolved around the “general situation of colonial rule rather than the
historical details.”7
Post-colonization, two decades passed before diplomatic relations with Japan were
restored. With historical animosity present, bilateral relations slowly emerged. The presence of
growing security concerns and regional matters assisted in bringing bilateral relations forward.
There was a brief time period when it appeared that South Korea had reconciled
relations with Japan through the 1965 Normalization Pact.8 The agreement postulated that
bilateral relations were resolved in relation to history in exchange for economic assistance and
loans. The treaty also articulated that no future remunerations or retribution would be sought.
This calm period would last through the 1970s. Coming off of a pact that provided the nation
remunerations and then President Park Chung-Hee’s efforts to contain historical discussions
added to this grace period.
It was the Park government that made treaties with Japan in 1965; therefore, critics
against the treaties meant critics against the government. It is well known that President
Park himself also had a career as a former military officer of the Manchurian Empire and,
therefore, the government was nervous about the time of colonial rule.9
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A 1982 textbook incident in Japan sparked what is now known as the textbook
controversy. The 1980s was truly the time period in which historical animosity began to rise to
the surface. Some scholars postulate that the changes developed due to South Korea’s recent
democratization and freedom of speech.10 It produced an environment conducive to free press
and the discussion of topics that was once not permitted. Another factor is the perceived rise of
Japanese nationalism, which became concerning to South Korea.11
In the 1990s a women’s movement emerged. With it came the emergence of the comfort
women matter. In time, a former comfort woman testified and international awareness increased
exponentially with the emergence of civil society groups and the inclusion of the United Nations.
SOUTH KOREA-JAPANESE RELATIONS
Twenty years following South Korea’s independence, then President Park Chung Hee
signed a treaty with Japan to normalize relations. 12 Stipulations included the establishment of
ambassadors, recognition as a state and monetary aid and loans for South Korea in the range of
$800 million. A highly controversial move at the time, it would prove to be a game changer for
the nation’s economic future. The funding would help launch the country’s industrial revolution,
which helped propel its economic standing. For some it was deemed too soon after colonization,
for others it was a beacon for economic prosperity.
Since that time, diplomatic relations between the two nations have fluctuated. Bilateral
economic relations started off strong with investments and high trade. Over time issues arose
such as the high trade imbalance which placed South Korea as the debtor nation, and Japan’s
continued relations with North Korea.
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With the onset of the Cold War, the two nations worked together to prevent the spread of
communism by China and North Korea. It appeared that historical matters were once again
pushed to the back burner as a greater security threat appeared to supersede this matter.
The 1980s marked the end of the Cold War and Japan’s rise as an economic powerhouse.
Over time, South Korea rebounded economically. Tensions arose once more in the 1990s, which
brought the comfort women issue to the fore.
In contemporary times, historical tensions have mounted due to the Yasakuni Shrine
visits by Japanese prime ministers, comfort women and the textbook controversy. Similar to
China, South Korea has expressed dismay at the visitation to the Yasakuni Shrine by Japanese
leaders.
On a domestic level, citizens have also expressed dislike toward Japan. A 2015 global
attitudes survey found that just “25% of South Koreans express favorable views toward Japan.
South Koreans believe that Japan has not apologized sufficiently for its military actions in the
1930s and 40s, according to a 2012 Pew Research Center survey.”13 The younger age group of
18-20 were more favorable toward Japan than the age group of 50 and above.14
While bilateral relations have fluctuated in the past two decades, the past three years have
proven to be one of the most difficult time periods for the two nations. Under President Geunhye’s leadership, she has stipulated the resolution and discussion of the comfort women matter as
a condition to moving bilateral relations forward.
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In 2015, there was a significant breakthrough with the resolution of the comfort women
issue. Along with an apology, Japan agreed to a restitution amount of $8.3 million toward the
comfort women victims. Both national leaders have expressed sentiments of hope for the future.
In recent times, the 2016 calls for impeachment of President Park Geun Hye brought
future bilateral relations with Japan into question. How will the next presidency work with
Japan? Will they honor the recent comfort women negotiation? Will this path of resolving
history be continued or will it bring a shift in leadership that ultimately brings this tranquil period
to a momentary close?
POLITICAL RHETORIC
In South Korea, distorted historical remarks provided by Japanese cabinet members and
former politicians are referred to as “blunders.”15 “The intermittent but often repeated ‘distorted
remarks and actions regarding history’ (so-called ‘blunders’) by Japan’s prime ministers, cabinet
members, and leading politicians have hindered progress in ROK-Japan relations as well as SinoJapanese relations.”16 As they frequently trigger a response from South Korea,17 there are periods
where these “blunders” instigate a political episode where bilateral relations falter but, over time,
are slowly renewed.
In addition to political remarks, scholars have identified additional practices that appear
to spark controversy and elevate historical tensions. Commemorative behavior by politicians has
been identified as another practice. Specifically it pertains to Japanese prime ministers visiting
the Yasakuni Shrine.
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Over the course of a decade, South Korea has seen three presidents: Roh Moo-hyun, Lee
Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, the nation’s first female president. This segment examines
political leaders’ speeches in reference to the early twentieth century history. Examined speeches
span from 2005-2015.
A nation’s stance on history is often revealed through policy formations and political
remarks. How is history referenced? Are there indications that South Korea is coming from a
forgiving or a non-forgiving stance? Has the stance evolved over the 10-year period?
LEE MYUNG BAK
Bak served as the 15th president of South Korea and was known for his “Sun Shine”
policy. The policy was geared toward bolstering relations with neighboring states from North
Korea to Japan. Over the course of his term, Bak visited Japan seven times.18
Compared to his predecessors, his domestic policies toward Japan were considered more
light-hearted. Albeit, throughout his speeches, Bak was steadfast in his stance that history must
be correctly maintained. In his third year in office, he emphasized the need to move past the
history between the two nations, but noted that the past will not be forgotten. While South Korea
will not always be tied to the past, forgetfulness will never occur. Lee further declared that Japan
needs to educate its youth on the historical matters for the future generations of both countries.
In his later years, he continued to make remarks around the theme of moving on from the
past but never forgetting, as was his stance on teaching history to the youth. In 2012 President
Myung-bak recognized the twentieth anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and
South Korea and the progress the two nations have made in that time.19
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In one commemorative speech, he mentioned the nation enduring the “harshest military
colonial rule.”20 He highlights the challenges the country faced with regard to their suffering in
the past and their progress since then with economic prosperity.
At other times he highlighted the fact that as neighbors we must help each other as South
Korea did when Japan had a natural disaster.21 He acknowledged that both nations had common
interests that can carry them forward into the future, however he discussed the need for history to
be accurately depicted. In one of his rare instances, he recognized the need for the comfort
women matter to be resolved.
PARK GEUN-HYE
President Geun-hye has remained resolute on the country’s stance against Japan’s
historical matter. In comparison to her father, she is similar in that both have made demands
from Japan. Her father sought economic loans and declarations in exchange for no future
demands. In juxtaposition, his daughter, now president, has asked Japan to reconcile the comfort
women matter. In 2015 she successfully garnered an agreement on the comfort women with
financial restitution to the survivors.
Since the inception of her term she has insisted on the resolution of the comfort women
matter. Comfort women are females who were coerced into establishments as sex slaves for
Japanese troops. The women came from South Korea, China, Taiwan and the Dutch. Forty-six
former comfort women are alive in South Korea.22 Park has made the comfort women matter her
platform issue with Japan in this historical memory debate.
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Back in 1993, Japan had submitted an apology recognizing its prior actions of forcing
women to serve as comfort women to Japanese soldiers. In March 2014, Tokyo decided to
review the 1993 apology. Thus, they embarked on a process of setting up a panel to review
evidence on the comfort women incident, specifically the testimonies of 16 Korean women.23
There were varied reactions. Some conservatives in Japan applauded the inquiry as they
believed that the incident is exaggerated and that these women were actually prostitutes. Upon
hearing about Japans’ decision, Park was adamant in saying that there was validity to the
testimonies and that Japan would only bring international isolation and should look to Germany
as a potential model for moving forward.24
Indeed, she made it a condition before moving forward in some bilateral relation matters.
Her refusal to meet with Prime Minister Abe and her remarks both domestically and
internationally have incurred bilateral tensions.
In one of her earliest speeches as president, she espoused the need for Japan to “reflect on
history correctly” so that the nations could move forward.
Only when there is honest soul-searching about the past will our two nations be able to
usher in a future of shared progress together. The historic dynamic of one party being a
perpetrator and the other party a victim will remain unchanged even after a thousand
years have passed. In order for our two nations to heal the wounds of the past as soon as
possible and march together toward a future of shared progress, it is necessary for the
Japanese Government to change unreservedly and behave in a responsible manner.25
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In another speech, she recognizes the positive role that Japan plays but emphasized that
the past must be resolved in order for the possibility of a bright future. She emboldened leaders
to have courage and expressed belief that many of the Japanese people would love to see our
nations work together for the prosperity of the region.26
From the beginning, she presented the idea that resolution of history was the only way to
move forward. In her second year she continued to balance her speeches with recognizing the
“painful history” while simultaneously acknowledging Japan’s efforts. In one speech she
highlighted Japan’s endeavors with the Murayama and Kono statements.
In time she began to move away from general statements in regard to history and made
specific declarations. March 2014 was the first speech where she outwardly stated the need to
teach accurate history in education. “Courage in the genuine sense is not about negating the past
but about facing up to history as it was and teaching undistorted historic facts to future
generations.”27
She further compelled the Japanese government to form decisions that would advance
bilateral relations. In particular, she highlighted the comfort women matter and the 55 survivors.
She espoused the notion of pending isolation and the “good precedent made by post-war
Germany” as a pathway for future cooperation and prosperity.28
Midyear, she continued to remark on how the nation has asked Japan to “take a correct
view of history” and mentioned the comfort women matter once more. She postulated that
resolution of the comfort women matter would lead to improved relations. “I believe this is the
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way for the Japanese Government to do the right thing and stand upright before future
generations.”29
In 2015 her speeches had a two-prong focus, one is comfort women and the second is
national patriotism. In one speech she identified comfort women as the “most challenging agenda
for the Korea-Japan relationship.”30 As bilateral comfort women talks began, she acknowledged
that resolution of the matter may not be satisfying for all, but that it was an effort that few
administrations were willing to lead.
She further acknowledged the challenging nature of the bilateral relationship in the past
three years due to this issue. She pointed out that a number of victims were dying each year.
Geun-hye openly addressed circulating rumors on agreement stipulations as untrue and false. For
instance, the notion that the statue memorializing a young girl would be removed was deemed
false.
She relayed the potential repercussions of turning down this agreement and how we
would be returning to the past. Geun-hye addressed the influential role of the media and the
hopes that emotions would not be inflamed. She concluded with the resolution of the “strained
bilateral relationship.”
Her second focus on national patriotism was highlighted at the March 1 Independence
Movement day. She paid tribute to the nation’s independence fighters and again espoused the
need for the Japanese government to address the comfort women matter.31 She was more explicit
in her statement regarding education. She remarked, “The continued attempts by the Japanese
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Government to publish school textbooks containing distorted facts damage relations with
neighbors.”32 She continued to highlight Germany and France’s bilateral relations and how they
overcame history to move Europe forward.33
Later in March she reflected on the progress of bilateral relations in terms of trade and
cultural exchanges, among others. She emphasized the need for the “Japanese Government to
promptly address the human rights violations against comfort women victims, who were forced
into sexual slavery by the Japanese imperial military during World War II.”34 She mentioned that
two victims passed this year.
At the 70th anniversary of Korea’s independence, she highlighted the Murayama and the
Kono statements as the “underpinning” of the bilateral relationship. Prime Minister Abe’s
remarks on the historical past were considered underwhelming.35
In a September 2015 address to the United Nations, she reflected on the positivity of
Korea celebrating their 70th anniversary of independence. She noted the “Asia paradox
phenomenon, where political and security cooperation lags behind the high-degree of economic
interdependence among the countries in the region.”36 She went on to highlight the need to pay
attention to sexual violence.
This year marks the 15th anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325
on women, peace and security, and the international community should do justice to the
occasion by paying greater attention to sexual violence against women in conflict
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situations. The most compelling reason is the fact that only a few of the victims of brutal
sexual violence during World War II are still alive today.37
In her remarks to the National Assembly in October she highlighted the government effort to
present correct history amidst her remarks on the 2016 budget plan.
The Government effort to normalize history education is intended to help our children,
who will be the leaders in the future, properly recognize our history and grow up with
pride as Korean citizens. If we are not properly aware of Korea’s identity and history, we
could become dominated by another culture or economy, and the Korean national spirit
could be eroded. Korea already has a painful wound from its history of being taken over.
For the future of Korea, to prepare for unification and to play a leading role with a solid
view of the state amid the rapidly changing status of international affairs, normalizing
history education is a natural task and the mission of our generation. Rectifying history
should not and cannot be a target of political strife. We will make all-out efforts to unite
divided public opinions through correct history textbooks and teach our children to take
pride in the legitimacy of Korea. There are concerns that state-authored textbooks may be
subject to distortion or glamorization of history, but I will never overlook publishing such
textbooks. There should be no more distortions and confusion over textbooks that are yet
to be written, or over what will never happen. I earnestly ask all of you to gather wisdom
and strength so that the young generation can establish a proper view of history and the
state and move toward the future in preparation for an era of unification.38
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On a national level, the nation has called for Japan to present correct history and
teachings to their youth. At the same time, South Korea has faced domestic criticism over the
government’s efforts to alter the nation’s twentieth century history. Specifically, it is in reference
to the authoritarian regimes that ruled the nation after World War II and the Korean War. Critics
argue that President Geun-hye is aiming to pose her father’s presidential rule in a more positive
light without acknowledging the harsh military government and extensive human rights issues.
In perhaps what will be known as her legacy, Park was determined to withhold bilateral
relations with Abe until the comfort women issue was resolved. In 2015 South Korea and Japan
reached an agreement that resulted in Japan providing financial retribution to the survivors.
Similar to her father, Park was able to garner an economic deal from Japan.
COMMEMORATION
Commemoration often reveals to what extent a state memorializes the past and its
practices. Commemoration can envelop many facets ranging from statues, holidays, ceremonies
and much more. Maintaining a tradition or ceremony is effective in continuing the narrative. For
example, a ceremony commemorating the independence of South Korea can incite feelings of
patriotism and also serve as a reminder of Japan’s role.
Efforts to memorialize history are instilled by the domestic government, interest groups
and civil society. Civil society in this case has emerged as a vocal voice to seek retribution for
the “comfort women.” Their campaign efforts have ranged from weekly demonstrations in front
of the Japanese embassy in Seoul to the erection of a statue of a young lady. While this group has
made extensive demonstrations of support, the government has also supported this initiative.
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MUSEUMS
Erecting museums in honor of the nation’s culture and history holds a greater meaning
for South Korea.
Archeologists and historians in some newly independent nations have recently begun to
study and record the vestiges of their national cultural history, of which much was
destroyed by neglect during colonial rule; but only in one or two rare instances have
governments planned a rational, coherent scheme to make their heritage widely known
internally and externally. Korea is one example, however, of a nation reacting against the
Japanese policy of stifling the teaching of its cultural history.39
Over the years, the nation has erected hundreds of museums. In Seoul alone there are
approximately 100. The museums range from historical museums to ones that focus on art and
culture.
One of the most prominent is the Seoul Museum of History which holds a permanent
exhibition that is focused on the 1910-1945 time period. The display highlights the growth of
urbanization under Japanese rule. It further recognizes discriminatory practices there were set in
place in favor of Japanese individuals versus Koreans.40
The National Museum of Contemporary History highlights various time periods but also
maintains a permanent exhibition. One ranges from 1876-1945.41 The uniqueness of this museum
is that “the narrow passageway and low ceiling are spatial representations of the oppression and
exploitation under Japanese colonial rule, while barriers and obstacles symbolize the
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overwhelming trials and tribulations of the period.”42 Previous commemorative efforts include the
erection of a bronze statue, a sculpture to the museum. In the central hallways there is a statue of
the patriot in which there are commemorative ceremonies. The exhibit also contains a memorial
room with a lit candle.
While the former two museums provide general historical background, there are a few
that specifically commemorate important locations and individuals. The Seodaemun Prison
History Museum, for instance, commemorates the location where Koreans were tortured and
killed for fighting for independence from Japan.43
The Seodaemun Prison History Hall was originally erected in 1907 by the Japanese.44
The hall commemorates the history of its use, how patriotic citizens who fought against the
colonizers were imprisoned and tortured. Many died and were executed. The hall is now an
independence park that memorializes the sacrifice of our ancestors and what the Japanese
committed in the past. Visitors are able to see prison cells and an exhibit of items that were
utilized to torture prisoners.45
The Seodaemun Independence Park is recognized as a “historical cultural site.”46 Within
the park there are commemorative statues that recognize patriots who once fought during the
independence park. The Seodaemun History Museum is also located within the park. The
independence hall now houses “2,327 memorial tablets to Korean independence activists.”47
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Statues such as Seo Jaepil and the Patriot Martyrs Monument were erected. The park is further
visited by many citizens per year.
The Tapgol Park is located at the nexus of where the independence movement in South
Korea began; this park is home to vestiges of the past.48 It is considered home to the
independence movement in 1919 that launched and is continuously commemorated annually to
this day. The independence movement was against the Japanese colonialism of Korea.
While South Korea has hundreds of museums, few commemorate individuals. One of the
highly commemorated individuals from the colonial times is Ahn Jung-geun, and the memorial
museum is named after him. Established in 1970 under President Park Chung Hee, the museum
was rebuilt in 2010 under President Roh Moo-hyun. The museum displays exhibits on his life,
writings and his efforts.
Considered one of the top independence fighters, he was killed in 1910 by Japan while
held in the Lushun Prison.49 He is remembered as a patriot fighter who was integral to the
independence movement for Korea. Further, he was recognized as a martyr who assassinated
Japanese national Hirobumi Ito in 1909.
What I wanted to achieve through my deed was to preserve the independence of Korea and
the peace of East Asia. I did not kill Ito out of personal vengeance; I killed him for the
peace of East Asia, I never intended to commit suicide even after I succeeded in killing Ito,
because the only objective I had in mind was far from being achieved.50
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Ito was identified as “the first resident-general of colonized Korea,”51 a Japanese individual
who committed many crimes against Korea. He is said to have assassinated Korea’s Empress
Myeongseong, often referred to as Queen Min, and is said to be responsible for the dethronement
of Korean Emperor Gojong. He further brought forth the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905 and the 1907
Korea-Japan Annexation treaty.52
HOLIDAYS
March 1 has been celebrated annually since 1949 as a day to remember when individuals
fought for the nation’s freedom. Often referred to as the “March 1st Movement” or the
Independence Movement, individuals met to convene and draft a “Korean Declaration of
Independence.”53 Individuals in multiple locations read the document out loud. “Mass
demonstrations took place in many parts of the country, forming the largest national protest rally
against foreign domination in Korean history.54
Violence ensued and thousands of individuals were killed, injured or incarcerated.
Although the nation was unable to achieve independence, it was the catalyst to the Provisional
Government of Korea in Shanghai.55 To date, the holiday is celebrated with reenactments,
parades and a “reading of the declaration takes place in a special ceremony at Tapgol Park in
Seoul, where the document was first read to the public.”56
The nation’s liberation day is celebrated on August 15. It is remembered as the day that
ended Japanese rule and Korea achieved independence.57 On August 15, 1945 Korea was
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liberated by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It is often called “gwangbokjeol,” meaning
“restoration of light.”58 The day is commemorated with parades and celebrations. The most
poignant event is a celebration held at the Sejon Center for the Performing Arts with attendees
such as the mayor of Seoul, political officials and individuals representing the Independence
Movement. The event culminates with the ringing of a bell at noon “to honour the memory of
former Independence Movement leaders.”59
MONUMENTS
A statue of a young lady sits facing the Japanese embassy in Seoul, South Korea. Erected
by a local group in 2011, it was sculpted by a Korean couple.60 The statue symbolizes the women
who suffered under the comfort women system. While this particular statue is most notable, 37
replicas exist throughout the nation. Perhaps the most controversial replica is the one that was
erected on December 28, 2016 in Busan. It was the one-year anniversary of the comfort women
resolution between South Korea and Japan.
Police in Busan had removed the statue but, due to public outcry, ended up leaving it in
place. Japan’s response was that it “violates the 2015 deal which agreed that Japan’s reparations
would ‘finally and irreversibly’ resolve the issue.”61 Japan has subsequently “withdrawn its
Busan consul-general and South Korean ambassador. It also suspended a currency swap and
postponed high-level economic discussions.”62
Other memorable monuments include cemeteries. The Seoul National Cemetery “was
established to worship patriots, patriotic martyrs and the souls of all the fallen heroes and the war
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dead who had participated actively during the Japanese Empire invasion, Korean War and
Vietnam War on June 15th 1955.”63 With maximum capacity reached, a second national cemetery
was erected by the name of Daejeon. This cemetery, too, was designed for visitors to worship the
fallen “for their distinguished achievements in their lifetimes.”64 A patriotic spirit shuttle bus is
provided for individuals to travel between both sites.65
Graveyards are separated based on service. For example there is one for police, patriots,
officers and service members, private soldiers and government officials. Several graveyards are
designated for patriots or independence fighters. Of those, individuals were recognized such as
Jo Sin Seong, Jo Cheol Ho, Gwak Nak Won, Kim In, Kim Ku, Haeseok Kang, Dal-Young Yoo
and Soeng-mo Choe.66 Commemorative events are held on 12 days throughout the year,
primarily on national holidays67 including a daily burial ceremony to honor the fallen.68 An
education program has been implemented which involves tours, a patriotic film and a volunteer
activity in the graveyard.69
CEREMONIES
On the anniversary of the nation’s liberation day, the South Korean president gives a
speech. Much like the U.S.’s State of the Union address, it is considered one of the top speeches
given by the nation’s president. It is seminal in that it is given on a national holiday and also
because it serves as a reminder of the country’s past.
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In 2010, it was perhaps the most pivotal presidential speech due to the relocation of
“Gwanghwamun, the main gate to the Gyeongbokgung palace.”70 It is a royal palace that has
remained in the country since the fourteenth century.71 During the nation’s colonization, the gate
was relocated by the Japanese in order to erect an imperial monument. In 1960 South Korea moved
the gate back to the original site and in 2010 restored the gate. The gate “represents a symbolic
restoration of Korean sovereignty prior to Japan’s colonial injustices while simultaneously serving
as a reminder of the colonial injustices that led to the relocation of the Gwanghwamun in the first
place.”72
EDUCATION
As a nation with few natural resources, the country has focused on educating citizens.
Today South Korea has one of the highest literacy rates in the world and a strong international
reputation for educational excellence.73 Indeed one might wonder why education is so highly
regarded. It is said that “national leaders who resisted the Japanese invasion pressed for the
“movement to save the nation through education.”74
South Korea has a public school system that is provided for free to students from the ages
of 6 to 15. High school for the 16 to 18-year-olds do require a small fee per year.75 The Ministry
of Education (MOE) oversees the curriculum for all schools in the nation. While there is some
flexibility given to schools, they still have the guideline oversight. In the 1970s and 1980s there
were MOE ordinances released to provide curriculum on Korean history, Japanese language and
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an “emphasis on national spirit.”76 The MOEs of the late twentieth century have focused on
moving towards an individualized study. The last two years of high school allows students to
self-select courses and curriculum.77
School textbooks are organized into three tiers. The first level is comprised of books
whose copyright is held by the MOE. The second level includes books that are published in the
private sector but still have MOE’s approval. Finally, there are books that are considered
“relevant and useful” by the ministry.78
In current times, South Korea has allowed high schools to select history textbooks among
many. Now, that rule is coming to an end. The state is moving to place greater autonomy over
history textbooks and curriculum starting in 2017.79 Relaxed regulation appears to have existed
for seven years, as the time period leading up to 2010 was marked by one textbook only.80 This
textbook book is entitled “The Correct Textbook of History.”
The concern about “distorting history” is not only relevant in terms of Japan and the past,
but also toward the U.S. and North Korea. Conservative and liberal parties differ on where
history should be highlighted from textbook freedom to how much history should be structured
by the government. For one side it depicts the oppression of the past and how the governments
controlled it, but the other party argues the opposite.
Elementary schools currently utilize the same history textbook that is approved by the
state.81 How much control should a government have over what history it teaches the citizens of
a nation? Control has the ability to raise national sentiment, continue harboring dislike for
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enemies past and potentially not move on from the past. It matters more perhaps because history
appears to incite some citizens toward action and can sometimes incite hatred or dislike.
THE TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY
School textbooks published in Japan have been under increased scrutiny with
neighboring states. The content is said to be controversial with its skim acknowledgement or,
rather, misrepresentation of history. Specifically it has to do with the early twentieth century
interactions with China and South Korea and how Japan’s own actions are depicted in Japan
The textbook controversy did not emerge until the 1980s. 1982 saw the first incident that
spurred this dispute.82 Japan was embroiled in an internal debate. Ienaga Saburo, a Japanese
professor, sued the Japanese government in 1967 and 1982 for censorship. As an author of
history textbooks, his publisher informed him that changes must be made. Ienaga cited such
oversight as against the constitution.
South Korea did not gain interest in Japan’s matter until a Chinese media outlet
denounced Japan and its textbooks. The Japanese government responded by asserting that the
“textbook examinations were ‘fair and object.’”83 Further, a textbook examiner remarked that
“Japanese mobilization in the Korean peninsula was ‘legal’ and not ‘forced.’”84 A South Korean
media outlet responded followed by the government, which made a statement condemning the
Japanese.
What was perhaps most significant about the 1982 incident was that “the Chinese
statement forced Japanese officials to make their historical perceptions public.”85 With Japan’s

82

Kimura, "Discovery of Disputes: Collective Memories on Textbooks and Japanese&#X2014;South Korean
Relations."
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.

85
response, South Korea felt they had no choice but to respond. Indeed, Kimura postulates that this
opened Pandora’s box. Aside from obvious government responses, it appeared that the citizens
of neighboring states were highly interested in this matter.86
Since then there have been diplomatic efforts to resolve the matter. In 2002 South Korea
and Japan embarked on a joint research project with the formation of a committee. The first
report was released in 2005.87 Neither government anticipated the level of public interest.
In 2005, a middle school history textbook in Japan sparked protests in South Korea and
China.88 The Japanese Society for History Textbook reform had written a textbook that was later
approved by the Japanese Education Ministry. Opponents argued that the textbook grossly
misrepresented Japan’s wartime actions.89 Demonstrators attended in the thousands in various
Chinese cities while two South Korean individuals cut off their fingers to protest the textbooks.90
In 2013 Park called for a joint history book that involves scholars from China, South
Korea and Japan. Later in 2015 Park called for a single history textbook for middle and high
school. As of late, South Korea has worked in unison with China and Japan to work on the
trilateral textbook.
COMPENSATION
On a domestic level, South Korea has made internal efforts to compensate those who
fought for Korea’s independence from Japan’s rule. Such domestic efforts will be outlined in the
punishment segment of this chapter.
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Perhaps what is most poignant is South Korea’s international call for Japan to
compensate former comfort women. This rallying cry has gradually grown in the past few
decades. The evolution began in the 1970s when international sex tourism became a burgeoning
cause in the nation.91 Two decades later, it evolved into the comfort women movement. An issue
that was not discussed from 1952 to 1965 became the hot topic in the 1990s.92
The 1990s was characterized by South Korea becoming fully democratized and gaining
membership to the United Nations (U.N.). A pivotal moment came when a former Korean
comfort woman testified and a professor in Japan found documents supporting the existence of
the comfort women system.93 This came in a time period where some Japanese politicians
questioned the authenticity of the comfort women system.
Such events added to the momentum and South Korea was further able to garner
international pressure on Japan. The Korean Council moved to publicize its cause at the U.N.,
which evoked international attention. Comfort women from other nations also began to testify
and speak. A U.N panel subsequently asked Japan to compensate the comfort women.94
Japan created the Asian Peace and National Fund for Women in 1995. While it is
technically classified as a non-governmental organization, it does have some government
influence and oversight.95 The two main objectives of the fund are to distribute atonement money
to each survivor as well as support medical costs.96 There was much controversy about the
creation of the fund in Japan and in other nations like South Korea. The Japanese government
funded the entire Asian Women Fund with the exception of the payouts to the women.97 Those
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came directly from donations from private citizens. Activists believed that Japan was attempting
to avoid legal responsibility by setting up a fund instead.
While some former comfort women in South Korea accepted the fund’s money, some
South Korean activists attempted to keep the group together in denying the fund. The Korean
Council eventually lobbied the South Korean government in 1997 and eventually won a payout
of $26,000 to each of the 140 survivors who did not accept the Asian Women’s Fund money.98
By accepting the funds from South Korea they stipulated that the women could not accept
funding from the Asian Women’s Fund.99
The twenty-first century saw a renewed interest in the comfort women matter. There are
53 comfort women still alive in South Korea today.100 The average age of these women is now
90.101 The government and civil society members have rallied a campaign against the Japanese
government by seeking direct compensation for these comfort women. Citizens have led
demonstrations in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul.
Today, these comfort women are housed in facilities with volunteers who assist them in
their daily lives. President Park argues that time is running out for these women and is asking
Japan to consider resolving the issue.
In 2015, South Korea and Japan resolved the comfort women matter with Japan agreeing
to pay $8.3 million dollars to a fund that would go to these women.102 A Japanese official
apologized and Prime Minister Abe apologized over the phone to President Park. The two
nations are now moving forward. The deal, however, has proved to be controversial in South

98

Ibid.
Ibid.
100
Dae, "Address by President Park Geun-Hye on the 96th March 1st Independence Movement Day".
101
Mizuho Aoki, "Time Running out for South Korean ‘Comfort Women’ as Average Age Approaches 90," The
Japan Times 2015.
102
Corporation, "Japan and South Korea Agree Ww2 'Comfort Women' Deal."
99

88
Korea. Some of the survivors disagree with the deal and others have opted to accept the
resolution.
The agreement overall includes funding, an apology, an irreversible resolution to the
matter and no further public commentary or remarks.103 Finally, the status of the comfort women
statue in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul, Korea will be re-examined. The U.S. aided the
resolution in this matter particularly in light of the region’s changing balance of power with
China on the rise and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.104
PUNISHMENT
In the aftermath of Korea’s independence in 1945, the southern segment of the nation
was ruled by the U.S. One of the primary objectives was to discover and punish nationals who
collaborated and worked in tandem with Japanese colonizers. Others included tracking down
pro-communist sympathizers.
Over time, these Korean nationals have been branded traitors or Japanese sympathizers
who should be punished. They are referred to as “chinilpa,” or “pro-Japanese factions.”105
Indeed, “making collaborators answerable to their own past constitutes a significant part of
liberated nations’ efforts to reach forgiveness and reconciliation during post-occupation
periods.”106 While a commission was erected, and hundreds of cases were investigated, very few
resulted in convictions with jail terms or capital punishment.
At the time of Japanese occupation, such individuals would have acquired benefits for
assisting the colonizers. “Japan not only provided rewards such as prizes, honors and money, but
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also threatened Koreans with imprisonment, unemployment and violence.”107 These individuals
came from various social classes and industry sectors. Some collaborators believed in the
Japanese cause, others may have done so for mere survival.108 Yet others fought against Japanese
rule and were often called the Korean freedom fighters.109 Overall, the time period was marked
by a division in society that was marred with casualties, deception and internal conflict.
With the subsequent Korean War, the nation was embroiled in a fratricidal conflict. At
the conclusion of the war, the nation’s leadership focused on rebuilding the nation. Purging
former collaborators was no longer the most prescient matter at hand. Indeed, there were civil
society groups who sought punishment for collaborators, but the U.S. was interested primarily in
establishing order. Many of the sought-after collaborators were in high-level positions under
Japanese rule and subsequently placed in the same role after Korea’s liberation.110 President
Rhee, a former collaborator also did not encourage this interest in prosecuting chinilpas.111
Following the war, various authoritarian regimes resumed power over the next several
decades. Once again, these rulers were more focused on removing or diminishing political
opponents than eliminating collaborators.
Starting in the late 1990s as Korea merged into a democracy, there was renewed interest
in punishing former chinilpas. Kim Dae-jung was the first president to truly allow space for
social discussion of past issues and sensitive topics.112 The Presidential Truth Commission on
Suspicious Deaths allowed for the investigation of individuals who were wrongly killed by past
regimes.
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President Dae-jung set the ground for what was to come under the Roh Moo-hyun
administration. The topics of collaborators and victims emerged in the national dialogue.
Collaborators were defined as,
Those who engaged in anti-national behaviors including the following: inflicting harm on
Korean independence fighters; signing treaties to surrender Korean sovereignty to Japan;
holding official positions of responsibility in Japan’s various colonial institutions;
mobilizing fellow Koreans into Japan’ invasion wars; and/or making donations to
Japan.113
Indeed, there was the establishment of a new act to “investigate the truth of anti-national
activities under Japanese imperialism in 2004 which led to the creation of a special committee in
2005.”114 As a result, two publications emerged, “the Source Books on Pro-Japanese AntiNational Activities and the Reports on the Investigation of the Truth of Pro-Japanese AntiNational Activities.”115 Overall, there appeared to be an effort to replace an anti-communist
sentiment with anti-colonialism while simultaneously increasing a sense of nationalism.116
A list of collaborators was released in 2009, subsequently bringing names into the public
sphere.117 There was public sentiment that descendants of collaborators should be punished.
Others contend that such collaborators have now deceased and it is unfair to punish descendants
who were never involved.118
In time, South Korea implemented land reform laws. There was the establishment of the
“Special Law to Redeem Pro-Japanese Collaborators’ Property” which mined the database for

113

Ibid.
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid.
114

91
land that was passed on to collaborator’s descendants and family line.119 The land that they
acquired through the family lineage was confiscated and returned to the state government. 120
Overall, 168 individuals and their family lands were confiscated in the amount of 13 million
square meters.121 Such chinilpas were identified as having spied for Japan and some were even
accused of aiding the assassination of their queen.
The proceeds from the land acquisition were to be distributed to Korean independence
fighters and their families. It was postulated that collaborators’ descendants led abundant lives
due to financial benefits they received; descendants of independence fighters often lived in
poverty or suffered great difficulty.
While Roh made progressive advancements, others cited political motivation for his
actions.122 Korea has two political factions, the progressive and conservative groups. Roh falls
into the progressive faction and it is common knowledge that those within the conservative camp
are primarily former collaborators and descendants.123
Collaborator descendants began to fight back against the state through legal action to
retain the property. Cases often cited impingement on constitutional rights and retroactive
punishment.124 Very few were successful in retaining their property. Beyond those who owned
land, descendants who sold property previously were asked to return the profits made from the
sale of the land.125
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While the commission group operated for several years only, some progress was made.
Critics on the other hand argued that the commission should have been operating longer and
potentially would have rooted out more collaborator’s land and resources.
Civil society groups and members have continued to maintain this momentum. The
Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities, for example, have released publications that
list 4,389 individuals.126
For some there was a sense that retribution has finally been accomplished. Collaborators
for far too long have been able to get away with past incriminations without punishment. For
others, there is still a sense that more could be done.
INFORMATION CONTROL
For much of the twentieth century, South Korea has been known for its lack of freedom
of the press. Governed by authoritarian governments for several decades, it was not until the
nation democratized in 1987 that restrictions were lifted. 127
Freedom House ranks the country 70th out of 180 countries worldwide for freedom of the
press with the designation of being “partly free.”128 The state’s ranking is most similar to Japan,
but in stark contrast to China’s ranking.
Since then, the nation has fluctuated in relation to how much press freedom was allowed.
There were intervals of time where greater freedom was granted and times when it was retracted
to varying degrees. In contemporary times, South Korea has made extensive progress toward
more freedom and individual rights.
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Traditionally, South Korea has maintained laws against espousing sympathy or
discussing communism. This was initiated back when the U.S. Army assisted the nation during
its transition toward independence from Japan in the 1940s. The United States Army Military
Government in Korea (USAMGIK) allowed freedom of the press, but backtracked to include
banning communist press.129 South Korea has maintained some of these clauses to this day
through the creation of the National Security Law. It designates any expression of “sympathy”
toward North Korea to be punishable by law.130 Further, there is no defamation against the U.S.
or South Korea.
The Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC) was established in 2008 to
oversee media and broadcasting communications.131 The KCSC has come under scrutiny with
recent findings that they have come down on critics of the Sewol incident under current president
Geun-hye, among other allegations.132 Many have stated that the KCSC is becoming an oversight
agency that is increasingly restricting freedom of speech. There is a copyright law that includes
the Korean Copyright Commission. Critics disagree with the commission’s ability to close down
a website from court rulings.
In 2009 bills were passed to reform media laws. Then President Myung Bak remarked,
the control of the broadcast media and the press by any administration has become a
thing of the past. I personally do not want media organizations to simply report in favor
of my Administration. In addition, such a lopsided coverage will never occur in the
future. What I want the media to do is to help relay facts to the general public through
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impartial broadcasting. This fundamental function of the media will not be compromised
because of any systemic change.133
Under former President Geun-hye, South Korea has increasingly become restrictive with
journalists. An October 2014 incident has sparked increasing concern about South Korea’s status
on freedom of expression. A bureau chief at a newspaper had criticized the government and the
individual was facing potential indictment.134 The nation has also been increasingly censoring
content on the web and internet within the country.135
While the country has made progress toward allowing greater media freedom, recent
developments have excited causes of concern by watch groups and other nations. In present
times, South Korea appears to be backtracking on its progress toward freedom of press.
CONCLUSION
As a once authoritarian state, South Korea has made extensive improvements since it
formed into a democracy. While the country has been praised for making great strides ranging
from the change of government to freedom of expression, in contemporary times it appears that
the nation has somewhat backtracked on its progress. For instance, the recent allegations and
claims about limitations to press freedom have brought consternation.
Overall, South Korea has maintained a comprehensive effort in maintaining a historical
narrative throughout the factors. Perhaps more compelling is the use of punishment, which is
unique compared to China and South Korea. In addition, South Korea has been similar to China
with its efforts to maintain a relatively stable narrative over the course of a decade.
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CHAPTER V
JAPAN
INTRODUCTION
Once an imperial power, Japan sought to conquer lands and rule over other nations.
During the early twentieth century, Japan invaded China in the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese War.1
In turn, Japan came to colonize South Korea from 1910-1945.
Since the conclusion of World War II, Japan rose unexpectedly in the economic and
political sphere on the world stage. For some time, the nation was ranked as one of the world’s
top three economies. Today, Japan is considered the world’s eighth most peaceful nation.2 The
Global Peace index considers 23 indicators such as “number and duration of internal conflicts,
impact of terrorism [and] military expenditure as a percentage of GDP.”3
Much of Japan’s peaceful standing is due to its 1945 surrender during World War II and
the official relinquishment of self-defense. The San Francisco Treaty stipulates that
Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations,
and in particular the obligations (i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;
(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.4
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Today, Japan is buttressed between attempting to normalize as a state, and reconciling its
historical past. This is perhaps one of the most controversial historical debates in history and
Japan is at the center of it. Events that occurred during the twentieth century still influence
trilateral relations between Japan, China and South Korea. Mired by controversy over textbooks,
the Yasakuni Shrine and the comfort women matter, bilateral relations with China and South
Korea have suffered in recent decades. Periods of peace are frequently interrupted by a
controversial event but peace eventually resumes.
This chapter will examine how Japan has maintained the narrative. How has Japan
maintained their historical narrative? In what manner has it been implemented in rhetoric,
education, commemoration, compensation and punishment?
REMEMBERING HISTORY
Japan was historically dubbed “Imperial Japan” with its efforts to expand and conquer
other lands. The catalyst originated with Commodore Matthew Perry arriving in East Asia in the
1850s. Two decades later in the 1870s, Korea and other surrounding nations opened up to the
world.
Since 1873 there was growing sentiment around the need to expand continentally in
consideration of the impending threat of Russia. Manchuria and Korea were considered the first
lands of exploration. However, “advocates of continental expansion became a formidable
political force only in the context of deteriorating relations with China and Russia between 1890
and 1904.”5
Concerned with western influence and power, Japan sought to control Korea as the next
closest residing nation. Subsequently, two wars were fought where Japan rose as the victor.
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Japan defeated China in the 1894-1895 war and against Russia in the 1904-1905 war and
subsequently captured South Korea in 1910 until 1945. Japan fought China in the Sino-Japanese
War of 1937-1945 until their defeat in the last year.
Following the end of World War II, “Japanese leaders glorified their colonialism as a
force that modernized Asia and liberated it from the Europeans.”6 There was also greater focus
on the war between Japan, the U.S. and their allies. Further, the victim complex came into play
with the nuclear bombings that Japan faced in the cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima.7 Aided by
U.S. interests, conservatives gained ground in Japan by espousing the need for education to
garner greater patriotism in the nation.8
In time, Japan transitioned from a territorial state to a peaceful and trading state.9 Based
on the terms of defeat, Japan demilitarized and changed its form of government. It merged from
a militaristic and authoritative form of government to a democracy.
In the 1980s the economy developed and grew exponentially. Japan built a strong
economy, rising to number two for some time before it was surpassed by China in 2010. Once
the foremost regional power, Japan has expressed growing concerns over China’s rise in
militarization and overall power. China’s elusiveness in military expenditure is concerning.
Chung argues that Japan is balancing against China through Taiwan and other measures.
It listed China as a threat in 2004 in its foreign policy documents. The threat of China has
brought on greater engagement on the part of Japan with the U.S. As some scholars posit, the
U.S. and Japan appear to be balancing against China.
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Over time, Japan has fluctuated between remembering the significance of the past to
times when history was simply overlooked. There were times when the nation appeared to be
conflicted with its past. Sometimes remorseful through periods of historic recollection, at other
times the nation appears to be divided internally between those who feel remorse, to those who
feel they should move on and even those who never felt apologetic.
Frictions over history have kept the nation divided. Party stances on history are divided.
Annual prime minster elections have led different parties to power. With it comes a virtual flip
flop of national narratives that is viewed as perhaps volatile to other nations.
At an individualistic level, Japanese nationals faced an about face. Children were said to
be the most impacted. In their educational system, military values were highly espoused on the
children and the enemies were the Britains and the Americans. Victory was viewed as highly
probable.
In the days following the nation’s surrender their values changed. What was once said
was now reversed. Our enemies, the Britains and Americans, are now our friends. Imperialism
was wrong and democracy is now right. A “national postwar forgetting of the war” ensued in the
decades to follow 1945.10
Cultural values and tendencies have complicated Japan’s overall path towards
repentance. “Including a deeply ingrained deference toward ancestors, submission to authority
and a victim mentality regarding the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.11 The
emperor was not dethroned, and officials who worked in the government before the end of World
War II was kept in place.”12
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This amnesia and lack of remorse period following the conclusion of the war is
contributed to several factors. The matters took place at a distant geographic location as opposed
to Germany’s case. Censorship existed, soldiers coming back did not reiterate what had occurred,
and, lastly, the atomic bombings in two of their cities incited a strong victim complex.13 While
the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals took place, General MacArthur opted not to include the
emperor on grounds that Japan needed to remain stable for the U.S.’ needs.14 In the proceeding
decades much emphasis was placed on rebuilding the nation and the economy, coupled with
societal values of collectivism versus individualism.
JAPANESE-SINO RELATIONS
While bilateral history goes back hundreds of years, Japan and China faced many
challenges in the last century. Marked by two Sino-Japanese wars, the past has remained a
sticking point in political relations. The most notable event from the second war is what is often
referred to as the Rape of Nanjing, or the Nanjing Massacre. While the number of Chinese
victims varies, an immense number of people were raped and/or killed. One scholar estimated
that 260,000-350,000 people died and that 20,000-80,000 women were raped.15 Another claimed
that seven women were raped.16
In the aftermath of World War II, Japan focused on rebuilding its economy. In time the
nations began to move forward. In 1978 the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship was
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signed.17 Dubbed a "new page in the history of Sino-Japanese relations and that of Asia at
large,”18 it was viewed as a momentous moment for the region.
For Japan it was a time where it appeared that states were moving on from history in the
hope for a greater trade partner. For China it was an opportunity to surpass Russia in the race to
garner advantages with Japan’s burgeoning rise in global industry and economy.
Loans and credits in the billions were given to China by Japanese banks and the national
government.19 Monetary assistance was not the only component that China gained but also
assistance in growing its domestic technology and industrial efforts and developments.20 The
treaty also helped usurp concerns about the Soviet Union’s increase in efforts to build the
military.21
Beginning in 1985 there were strains on the bilateral relationship from trade imbalance,
and Japan’s continued relationship with Taiwan and historical episodes.22 Further, Japan was
recognized internationally for its economic progress and for its ranking as the world’s second
highest economy.23 In time, China came to usurp Japan’s economic standing by overtaking their
number two standing worldwide.
For some time, Japanese politicians did not talk about China or holding a stance on their
military threats.
When it comes to evaluating how China might react in certain circumstances, the
Japanese government has had reservations about taking an official position on China's
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military might. Even scholarly research in Japan on the Chinese military is not welcome.
Most experts on the China military are in fact historians.24
Over time it has changed. Japanese politicians are now being more open about their
opinion and stances on China. The overarching points of concern include “nuclear weapons, the
defense budget’s rapid and continuous growth and its allocation, which has not been entirely
accounted for.”25
Coupled with China’s protests and diplomatic reactions to Yasakuni Shrine visits and
history textbook matters, the public of Japan has fluctuated in its opinion on its neighboring
state. A 2005 poll by Gallop and Yomiuri Shimbun indicated that 72 percent of the population
did not trust China and 76 percent felt China was a threat.26 A 2015 Global Attitudes survey
found that eight out of 10 Japanese believed that the Chinese are arrogant.27 Around 75 percent
also believe that China is nationalistic.28 The generations above the age of 50 were more likely to
see the nationalistic side of the Chinese compared to the younger generation. Overall, such polls
indicated the fluctuation of poll results.
JAPANESE-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS
As a colony of Japan from 1910 to 1945, Korea made no attempt to foster immediate
bilateral relations. Several decades would pass before a détente was to take place. In the 1970s,
the two nations worked to reopen political relations and began to expand on trade relations.
Japan invested heavily in South Korea and provided prodigious economic loans.
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For some time, the two states focused on a forward looking approach. In time, historical
matters arose around the late 1980s with the controversial textbook matter and the comfort
women matter in the 1990s. Prime ministers have also visited the Yasakuni Shrine intermittently
over the years. The visitations were made to honor those who have given their life for the
nation’s freedom.
A poll indicated that on a citizen level, 27 percent of Japanese view South Korea in a
favorable light.29 This 2016 assessment is in great contrast to the survey in 2006 in which 56
percent of the Japanese were favorable to South Korea.30
In recent times, Japan has faced stifling political relations with South Korea over former
President Park Geun-hye’s stance on the comfort women matter. Politically it has been
challenging for Japan to work with the nation and recently their relations have been considered
frosty.
Since the resolution of the comfort women matter, bilateral relations have calmed.
However, it recently sparked new controversy with the implementation of a statue of a young girl
in Busan.31 Japan has recalled their ambassador to Busan citing that the comfort women issue
was resolved under President Park Geun Hye.32 With Geun-hye’s recent impeachment trial, it is
uncertain where the future of the bilateral relations will lie. Will future presidents honor the
terms of the comfort women resolution? Wouldn’t resolution of this matter mean there are far
fewer issues for historical tensions to be based upon?
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POLITICAL RHETORIC
Over the years there have been numerous “blunders” committed by former and current
Japanese politicians or cabinet members. 33 As the frequency of blunders rose, the consequences
changed. Prior to 2001, such blunders would result in the resignation of politicians due to public
outcry by neighboring states such as Korea and China.34 After 2001, resignations appeared to be
more infrequent.35
A secondary factor has been the prime minister visits to the controversial Yasakuni
Shrine. Prime ministers varied: some chose to visit and others did not. Often times, it was
determined by which political party they came from, as well as domestic and international
factors.
In the span of 10 years, Japan has seen eight different prime ministers, each having
served one term with the exception of Shinzo Abe. Over the course of multiple years, the
political remarks have fluctuated vastly. In addition, the Yasakuni Shrine was visited in 2005,
2006 and 2013 by the respective prime ministers.
One of the primary considerations is the division in political party ideology. The Japanese
conservative party tends to hold its past in a more positive light and are less repentant over the
past. Conservative party members are more likely to reflect that an apology has already been
made and financial compensation has been provided. Future generations should espouse
patriotism and matters have been resolved through the treaties with China and South Korea, they
believe.36
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Individuals on the liberal party side tend to hold themselves responsible for the past and
thus are more repentant in nature. Liberal party members are more likely to continue issuing
apologies, provide remunerations to victims, oppose re-militarizing and prefer history textbooks
that provide more detailed descriptions of past actions.37 In the following segments, I will
highlight the role of apologies, shrine visits and prime minister remarks.
APOLOGIES
To date, Japan has proffered numerous apologies about the past. Apologies to South
Korea have been more extensive in nature as compared to China. The very first such statement
took place in 1965 when Etsusabura Shiina, the then foreign minister in Japan apologized to
Seoul.38 This was around the time that bilateral relations normalized. Further, the statements
have been more specific and apologetic. They have ranged from expressing sorrow to deep regret
over the years.39
It was around the 1990s that more apologies began to emerge. Prime Minister Hosokawa
in 1993 made remarks with great detail that included the terms “genuine contrition and deepest
apologies.”40
The most notable would be the Murayama statement, named after then Prime Minister
Tomiichi Murayama. His remarks in 1995 were considered some of the most memorable and
poignant for their time due to the use of terminology such as aggression.41
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national
policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful
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crisis, and through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and
suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the
hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these
irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and
state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning
for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.42
Since that time, the statement has been referred to as the cornerstone of the historical
memory policy for subsequent governments.43 Preceding prime ministers have repeated the
statement or made similar remarks. However, there have been parties in power that have moved
against the statement.44 Such prime ministers have chosen to diverge from the Murayama
statement by offering apologies that were more generalized and less repentant in tone.
In its apologies Japan has been most dogmatic in its remarks to South Korea compared to
China. At times the South Korean president would accept such apologies. In an unprecedented
move, then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung extended an invitation to visit Korea to the
Emperor of Japan in 1998.45 In turn, Dae-jung visited Japan and the Prime Minister Keizo
provided a deep apology to Korea for the colonization period.46
Three years later bilateral relations imploded with the textbook controversy in Japan.
South Koreans were incensed with the lack of historical accuracy in the textbooks regarding the
colonization period and Japan’s role.47 The lackluster response from Japan’s Prime Minister
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Koizumi and government continued to fuel the outrage.48 Indeed, the 2001 textbook incident was
a turning point for bilateral relations.
Prime Minister Koizumi began to visit the Yasakuni Shrine that same year and for several
subsequent years. It brought another contentious matter to the fore. Vast demonstrations arose
and Koizumi maintained his practice of annual visits. At the same time Koizumi made efforts to
quell discontent. In 2001 he visited South Korea at the Sodaemun Independence Park and a
Korean museum that recognized those who fought for the nation’s independence.49 “He spoke of
his “heartfelt remorse and sorrow of the great pain inflicted on South Koreans by Japan’s
colonial rule.”50
A year later, in 2002, the emperor of Japan announced that he had Korean ancestry. His
remarks were viewed as an effort to renew diplomatic relations and indeed it worked—it
appeared to quell the textbook demonstrations from South Korea.51 Such efforts did not last long,
as Koizumi continued to visit the Yasakuni Shrine through 2005. Further, there were tensions
over the island dispute of Dokdo and Takeshima in 2005.52 The pressure of trilateral matters
converging from the textbook controversy to the shrine visits and the territory disputes proved to
be too much. Diplomatic relations would stall from 2005-2007.53
After Koizumi’s end in office in 2006, Shinzo Abe became prime minister. His efforts
did not help alleviate diplomatic relations. The U.S. House of Representatives even worked on a
resolution asking “Japan to apologize to the comfort women,” which Abe actively lobbied
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against. In the end, the resolution passed and was ignited by a U.S. congressman who is of
Japanese and American ethnicity.
Japan has proffered several apologies to China in the past. In the 1970s Japan offered a
general statement to China highlighting remorse. This was also the time that U.S. President
Richard Nixon was the first to visit China. The first apology aided the normalization process for
both states.
Since then, Prime Minister Koizumi made a statement on the 60th anniversary of the war.
In essence he continued the tradition of maintaining the Murayama statement by recognizing the
“tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of
Asian nations.”
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In 2015, the 70th anniversary of the war, Abe made remarks highlighting “feelings of
profound grief and my eternal, sincere condolences.”55 He recognized the millions of lives that
were lost, those who suffered and the comfort women. In his remarks he cited several countries
including China and South Korea.
Compared to South Korea, the apologies are less comprehensive in nature. They are
generally more symbolic and generalized. Both nations have paid close attention to Japan’s
remarks regarding history in recent years. China and South Korea’s government has at times
criticized certain apologies as lacking remorse or regret. Others have a problem with Japan
espousing patriotism for their past.
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SHRINE VISITS
The Yasakuni Shrine is home to spirits of individuals who passed while fighting for
Japan. Established in 1869,56 it was not until 1978 that controversy came to pass. That year, the
names of Class A war criminals were included in the shrine, much to the dismay of neighboring
states.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s there was an effort by the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) party to reinstate state contributions to the maintenance of the Yasakuni Shrine.57 With
five failed attempts to pass a bill through the legislature, to date the shrine does not receive
government funding.
Historically, the shrine has been a place of veneration by the public, long before it
became a ground for political contestation. Today, it is also a place where citizens pay their
respects and families of those bereaved.58
Since then visitations by prime ministers have been contested. The very first was when
Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro visited in 1985.59 At the time he faced protests from the
Chinese Communist Party Hu Yaobang, General Secretary.60 For the remainder of Yasuhiro’s
terms he avoided visiting the shrine.
From 2005-2015, Japan’s prime minister visited the Yasakuni Shrine three times.
Considered a highly controversial site, sporadic visitations have been questioned by neighboring
states. Koizumi is perhaps most known due to his annual consecutive visits from 2001-2005.
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Indeed, one such visit resulted in a 2001 lawsuit against Koizumi by 639 plaintiffs for violating
constitutional restrictions on the separation of religion and the state.”61
In his last visit as prime minister in 2005, he faced regional consternation from China and
South Korea by way of political remarks. On the domestic front, there was a demonstration in
Tokyo with approximately 1,000 people marching against Koizumi’s visitation. Candlelight
vigils were held in some locations.
Some were disappointed that he did not visit on August 15, others were critical that he
visited at all. The Shinto priests were dismayed that he did not commit the proper number of
bows in fulfilling the ritual.62
In its defense, Japan has argued that it is their internal affairs as to how they choose to
commemorate those who died for their nation.63 Some say that such visitations are on a personal
level, not a state level.64 Another perspective is provided by a former military officer, “I know
there are class-A war criminals enshrined here, but they had to follow the national policy at that
time. In a wide perspective, they might also have been victims of the war.”65
Based on a survey that polled politicians in Japan, members of the LDP indicated that the
shrine is viewed as a proper place to commemorate those who fought for the nation.
Furthermore, nations should not be concerned with Japan’s internal matters.66 From a political
standpoint, they contend that China and Korea’s reactions are to bolster their state’s sense of
nationalism.67 The state of patriotism in the youth is considered an important factor. Those on the
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opposite ends oppose such visitations by the prime minister and do not agree with enshrining the
class A war criminals.68 While the survey generalized based on party, there were indications that
parties are further divided. Some members of the LDP opposed shrine visits.69
The act of having a national leader pay respects at a site that commemorates war
criminals, leads other nations to believe that Japan is in essence condoning what they did in the
past. Japan’s own constitution, Article 20, explicitly states that a “representative of the state
cannot pay tribute at a religious institution without violating the principle of separation of
religion and state.”70
Aware of potential repercussions, one might ask why a prime minister would continue to
attend such visits. Knowing the conflict it will cause, why continue to do so? For Koizumi he
cited it as an election promise—if elected he would visit the Yasakuni Shrine.
In other ways, such maneuvers may be considered defending the nation. Espousing the
idea that our internal matters are not to be meddled with, that we stand proud of our nation and
our citizens. It can also be understood as Japan making a point: that Japan will not back down
and other nations will not control what we or I as a leader chooses to do.
PRIME MINISTERS
Over the course of a decade, Japan would see seven prime ministers take office. Along
with the changes in leadership, Japan exhibited an evolving discourse in regard to history.
Koizumi served from 2001-2006. He would prove to be one of the more controversial prime
ministers with his annual Yasakuni Shrine visitations. And yet, he would make apologetic
statements addressing the past in regard to China and South Korea.
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Prior to Koizumi’s resignation in 2006, he offered a statement of apology in 2005. He
remarked that the
colonial rule and aggression caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of
many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Sincerely facing these facts of
history, I once again express my feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology, and also
express the feelings of mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, in the war. I
am determined not to allow the lessons of that horrible war to erode, and to contribute to
the peace and prosperity of the world without ever again waging a war.71
Following Koizumi, Prime Minister Fukuda often remarked on the “future-oriented”
relationship with China and South Korea. He also made an apology in August 2008
acknowledging the suffering that Asian nations endured. He further expressed remorse for the
victims and the past. Like many of his successors he exemplified the nation’s commitment to
peace and maintaining that prerogative for the future.
Under Prime Minister Aso, China and Japan celebrated 30 years of friendship. In regard
to South Korea he reiterated the joint statement that “Japan and the Republic of Korea shall face
the matter of history squarely, hold a clear vision of the future and enhance bilateral relations.”72
Further, the trilateral summit between China, Japan and South Korea took place and
collaborative efforts were made to discuss various areas and sectors.
Overall, Aso would meet with the leadership of both nations multiple times, perhaps more so
than any of the prime ministers in the twenty-first century.
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Hatoyama, like many of his predecessors, highlighted the need to review history in the
context of looking ahead to the future. Hatoyama would subsequently convene the second
trilateral summit meeting between the nations.
On the 100th anniversary of when the Japan-Korean Annexation Treaty was established
and colonial rule began, Prime Minister Kan released a statement acknowledging the event and
the “tremendous damage and sufferings that this colonial rule caused, I express here once again
my feelings of deep remorse and my heartfelt apology.”73 He gave perhaps one of the most
explicit apologies with his mention of how “the Korean people of that time was deprived of their
country and culture, and their ethnic pride was deeply scarred by the colonial rule which was
imposed against their will under the political and military circumstances.”74 Most poignantly, in
his remarks he noted that Japan will release historical archives that were part of the royal dynasty
in South Korea. At a later press conference Kan noted that he had a phone conversation with
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and how he deeply appreciated the statement. At the
August 15 anniversary date, Kan made statements once again acknowledging the suffering that
Japan caused and expressed remorse for the past. Much like his predecessors, Kan would often
highlight the future orientated manner for bilateral relations.
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda would have a challenging bilateral relationship with
South Korea as President Myung-bak visited the controversial Takeshima Island. Both nations
are in conflict over the ownership of these islands. Subsequently, bilateral relations suffered
during his term.
Shinzo Abe became prime minister once again in 2013. During his term he often touched
on remorse, and the immense tragedy of war. “In the past, Japan caused tremendous damage and
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suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Feelings of deep
remorse regarding these matters were the starting point for Japan after the war.”75
However, he would also prove to be controversial with his 2013 visit to the Yasakuni
Shrine. Abe espoused his personal desire to pay tribute to those who passed for the country.76 He
recognized that the “Yasukuni Shrine has become a political and diplomatic issue.”77 In the
same remarks he pledged Japan’s continuous commitment that Japan would never wage war.78
Most poignantly, during his term a bilateral deal was made with South Korea regarding
the comfort women. During the process, however, he caused tensions by creating a commission
to determine the validity of the comfort women system.
Overall, Abe committed to a future Japan that would always seek peace over war.79 At
times he espoused the need to remember ancestors and those who fought for Japan and died.80
Much of his remarks highlighted the apologetic tone of history and were forward looking.
COMMEMORATION
Commemoration is a way for a nation state to memorialize the past. In this
segment, museums, holidays, monuments and ceremonies will be assessed to determine the
extent of the nation’s efforts. Beyond the central government, and similar to the other case
studies, Japan’s civil society members have also played a role in constructing a narrative.
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Perhaps most unlike the other two nations, Japan has revealed a society that is dually contested
in how to commemorate some aspects of history.
MUSEUMS
In present day Japan the nation has 5,614 museums with over 3,200 of those classified as
history museums.81 Museums are not purely founded by the federal government but also “local
governments, general incorporated associations or general incorporated foundations, religious
corporations [or] juridical persons stipulated by cabinet order.”82
The most controversial place of commemoration is considered the Yasakuni Shrine.
Named by Emperor Meiji, the shrine houses almost 2.5 million names of those who sacrificed
their lives in past wars.83 Located in Tokyo, it has been in existence since 1869. The name
Yasukuni means “wishes for preserving peace of the nation.”84
The shrine has caused much international controversy due to the fact that seven of the
listed names are wartime criminals. The prime minister and other high officials visit the shrine
and pay their respects much to the chagrin of South Korea and China. The veneration of such
individuals is viewed as troubling and highly concerning.
The website clearly recognizes the issue as there is a statement alluding to the fact that
there are individuals who were recognized as war criminals per the point below:
“There also enshrined ordinary Japanese citizens, Taiwanese and Korean people died as
Japanese, the people who died during the Siberian detaining, and who were labeled war criminals
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and executed after having been tried by the Allies.”85 Each time there is a visit by a Japanese
prime minister, there are demonstrations by citizens in China and South Korea.
Attached to the shrine is the Yushukan Museum, which is not as well known. The
museum contains and displays “historically important wills and relics.”86 Founded back in 1882,
it further maintains a collection of art, weapons and other relics.87
Japan also commemorates and honors those who have fought and died for their country.
The Chiran Peace museum recognizes the soldiers who fought during World War II.88 In
particular, those deceased were pilots. The museum holds numerous articles in memory of those
who have passed.89 This museum is recognized as being part of the federal government’s project.
From a public memory standpoint, scholars have examined museums and other
commemorative entities to determine the overall national stance on history. Does the nation
“accept or deny Japan’s war atrocities and responsibility?”90 Overall, the nation has around 80
museums that focus on Japan’s history in the early twentieth century and appear to focus on the
clause that historic acts are not to be repeated.91 It is matched with an equal focus on peace.
Other museums such as Shokeikan and Showakan were formed in the context of
“remembering suffering.” They are predicated on the idea that citizens went through great
sacrifice for their nation—not just soldiers but everyday people. Originally the museum was
thought to be formed in the context of a war memorial museum. However, due to disagreements,
it evolved into focusing on the people.
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Overall it appears that the nation is battling with reconciling its victim role with the
atomic bombings to being the aggressor state. The nation’s approach is based on the idea that
“past experiences are rehabilitated in the context of the peaceful present.”92 It is also a battle
between divergent ideological approaches. The Japanese right believes that “military sacrifice”
should be celebrated while the left prefers “acknowledgement of Japan's wartime atrocities.”93
HOLIDAYS
Japan has 17 national holidays in place.94 Of those, two are focused on commemorating
history. National Foundation day is celebrated annually on February 11 to commemorate the day
the country was founded.95 It is said that an individual named Jimmu discovered the nation back
in 660 BCE.96
It is a patriotic day that is set “for the purpose of ‘recalling the founding of the national
and cultivating a mindset of love of the nation.’”97 Citizens often reflect on the past and the
efforts made by ancestors and their role in bringing the nation to where it is today.
The Constitution Memorial Day is celebrated on May 3. It represents the day that the
nation produced a new constitution after World War II.98 It is viewed as the emergence of more
individual rights for citizens and a turn toward a more democratic nation.99 “This constitution
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declared that each Japanese citizen is entitled to the freedoms of assembly and speech. Workers’
rights and the right to due process were also guaranteed by the new constitution.”100
MONUMENTS
The Japan-China Friendship association has been in existence for several decades with
chapters in both nations. Extensive commemorative efforts from events to cultural activities were
conducted in Japan. This was set to recognize and remember the atrocities that the Chinese faced
from Japan historically. Particularly from the 1960s-1980s
Local Friendship Association chapters erected stone monuments all over Japan to
commemorate Chinese victims of Japanese wartime aggression, to reflect on Japan’s war
responsibility, and to remind subsequent generations of the lessons of that war and the
abuse of human rights in the name of imperialism and militarism.101
There was one that was placed in 1966 in honor of the Hanaoka massacre. It beared the
terms “growing tradition of friendship” and “against aggressive war.”102 Another stone
monument espoused the words “Never again war between Japan and China.”103 While openly
acknowledging the role that Japan played, the chapter also considers Japanese nationals who
resisted their nation’s military efforts.104
The chapters in Japan faced some resistance from fellow nationals. Some argued that they
were advocating for China and the communist ideology.105 Incidents occurred over the years in
which local Japanese would place the Chinese flag on fire or sent in threats when annual
conferences were held. In particular, the 2005 demonstrations in China against the Japanese
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textbooks resulted in the cancellation of the association’s annual conference in Japan.106 This
was due to threats that the chapter received around that time.
CEREMONIES
An annual ceremony is held on August 15 to honor those who passed in wars.107 Each
year this ceremony is observed in relation to remarks expressed by the prime minister more so
than the emperor. At the 70th anniversary of World War II in 2015, Emperor Akihito voiced
remorse for the past.108 This was in contrast to Prime Minster Abe’s remarks, which alluded to
the previous apologies given by his predecessors. Beyond political remarks, the nation’s leader is
also watched to determine whether the Yasakuni Shrine is visited by the prime minister.
EDUCATION
Similar to other East Asian nations, Japan places a high societal value on education. With
a population of over 126 million,109 the adult literacy rate is 99 percent.110 Based on the 1947
Basic Act on Education, Japan has implemented a national educational system that gives the
right to education for all citizens. Along with other measures it espoused the need for the
“prohibition of partisan political education, prohibition of religious education for a specific
religion in the national and local public schools.”111
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In 2006, the law was subsequently revised with changes including “placing value on
public-spiritedness and other forms of the ‘normative consciousness’ that the Japanese people
possess, as well as respecting the traditions and culture that have fostered said consciousness.”112
At the age of six, students must attend elementary school for six years, followed by three years in
lower secondary school.113 Upper secondary school is available to students based on entrance
exams.
Some civil society groups believed that after World War II, Japan’s teachings in history
presented Japan in a negative light to its own citizens. Concerned with the views that children
were forming about the nation, groups advocated for a more patriotic view of the past.
The Yushukan is one of a number of institutions and individuals that have been
attempting to write Japan’s war history in a more positive light over the past twenty years
and to provide the base for a more patriotic education of Japanese children. Through its
association with the Yasakuni Shrine, the Yushukan has become the de facto institutional
center for the articulation of patriotic public memory of the Asia-Pacific War as a
historical narrative.114
THE TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY
From the time the law was implemented in 1947, the textbook process has generally
remained the same.115 Textbooks are published by entities that are non-governmental and are
submitted to the Ministry of Education. Within the ministry lies the “Textbook Approval
Research Council.”116
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Once submissions are made, the council will review the text and compare against any
textbook examination standards. The council has the ability to request revisions and make a final
recommendation to the greater Ministry of Education.117 All approved textbooks will then be
showcased to communities in which the local school boards will select the final textbooks for
this schools.118
The first textbook incident occurred in 1955 domestically with disagreement over history
textbooks being utilized for Japanese citizens.119 They were deemed “deplorable, arguing that
they reflected anti-Japanese and pro-Chinese leftist thought.”120 Since then, nothing went beyond
the nation’s borders until 1982.
News outlets in Japan were reporting that the Ministry of Education was requesting
changes in history textbooks with the basis of providing a more nuanced narrative.121 Those in
charge were often from the conservative camp and preferred to present history in a more positive
and ambiguous light.122 Neighboring nations such as South Korea and China caught on and
began to voice dissent on the topic.
This incident began to make an impact on all three nations. For Korea, it stirred
discussion about history, moving away from depending on Japan and talk about democratizing.
Then President Doo-hwan made great efforts to control the press.123 For China, Xiaoping was
immersed in a domestic battle over power and launched the “socialist spiritual civilization
campaign.”124 For Japan, it led to the resignation of Prime Minister Zenko and the inclusion of a
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“Neighboring Countries Clause. It stipulated that consideration should be given to neighboring
countries’ perspectives, somewhat facilitating the inclusion of more critical passages into
textbooks.”125
In the 1990s two prominent newspapers in Japan warred over how to recognize history.
The Asahi newspaper was progressive and moved towards recognizing the wrongdoings of the
past.126 In contrast, the Sankei newspaper believed in recognizing the militaristic and glorified
past.127
In 2001, South Korea expressed great dismay that Japanese textbooks refused to address
the comfort women.128 A few years later in 2005, the newly approved history textbooks sparked
the greatest contestation thus far. There was extensive uproar from China and South Korea
resulting in city-wide demonstrations. The textbooks were deemed unfit, an ill representative of
history, and accused of glossing over the role Japan played in the past with these two nations.129
Throughout the textbook controversies the three nations have made efforts to write
common textbooks that could provide a mutually agreed-upon view of the past. While current
efforts appear to mitigate the matter, the long-term results are still in question.
COMPENSATION
Over the years, Japan has faced restitution claims from individuals, groups and states.
The two most highlighted include the comfort women from China, South Korea and other
nations to forced laborers.
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In recent times, the comfort women have garnered the most success. The first attempt
was the creation of a civil society group in Japan that sought to provide medical aid and
remunerations to comfort women victims. In time, a state to state agreement was concluded in
2015 between South Korea and Japan.
Following the resolution, China has put in claims that Japan should also compensate
comfort women in their nation. One report indicates that China had 200,000 victims in the
comfort system with 166 stations in one city of Shanghai.130
Beyond the national front, Japanese corporations have faced lawsuits by individuals or
their families for being forced to leave their nations and work in harsh conditions for Japan and
various firms. The Kajima Corporation paid out a reported $4.6 million.131 The Mitsubishi
corporation offered an apology and compensation to 3,765 Chinese forced laborers in 2015.132
Of those, 720 were given posthumously. The compensation is in the amount of $16,000 dollars
to each individual and includes the erection of a monument.133
Citing the San Francisco treaty, Japan has claimed that reparations do not need to be paid
to states or individual victims. However, it appears that there have been advancements in recent
times to compensate victims.
On the domestic front, Japan has provided compensation to Japanese nationals who
fought in the war and their bereaved families. The Bereaved Families association obtained a
pension system in the 1960s.134

130

Kor Kian Beng, "Calls in China for Apology, Compensation from Japan," 2015.
Howard French, "Japanese Veteran Testifies in War Atrocity Lawsuit," The New York Times 2000.
132
Xinhuanet, "Japan's Mitsubishi to Offer Apology, Compensation to Chinese Forced Laborers in Wwii,"
Xinhuanet 2015.
133
Ibid.
134
Andrew Pollack, "Japan Wonders If Premier's Tie to Rightists Is Ended," The New York Times 1996.
131

123
Those enshrined in the Yasakuni Shrine were “offered a spiritual reward for those
soldiers who died fulfilling this duty: death in the emperor’s name earned a soldier’s spirit the
statue of a divine spirit, once it had undergone the Yasukini enshrinement ceremony.”135
The value of fighting and dying for the emperor and the nation was highly espoused. “The
customary farewell of World War II Kamikaze pilots to each other, “see you at the Yasukuni
Shrine,” represented the most extreme, and final, embodiment of this spirit.”136
PUNISHMENT
Overall, Japan appears to make concessions in various forums from textbooks to comfort
women. A group entitled “Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform” released a history
textbook to be used at middle school.137 The references to history were considered revisionist
and overlooked historical actions. The Ministry of Education went so far as to have the textbook
undergo revisions in consideration of neighboring states before publication in 2001.138
Civil society groups in China and South Korea emerged and worked in tandem with likeminded individuals in Japan. They collaborated to protest the textbook being selected by
Japanese schools as they depicted Japan’s historical actions in a more positive light.139
INFORMATION CONTROL
Japan ranks 72nd out of 180 states for freedom in journalism.140 The nation has a press
freedom score of 25 out of 100 with 0 being the best and 100 the worst.141 In recent decades
Japan has made progress expanding freedom of the press since its militaristic imperial days.
Based on the constitution, citizens have the right to free speech and press.
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In recent years the nation has come under controversy with the 2014 Protection of
Specially Designated Secrets Act. It deems “whistleblowers who leak vaguely defined “state
secrets” can face up to 10 years in prison, while journalists who publish leaked information can
face up to five years in prison. The law also grants ministers the power to designate certain
information as state secrets for up to 60 years.”142 Domestically, there have been voices of
concern about the restrictions that this law places.
In other areas, journalists as a group has been criticized for often writing pieces that
highlight the government in a positive way or, rather, refraining from writing critical stories. The
Fukushima incident is one example in which articles have generally reiterated any statements
made by the government rather than critiquing their actions.143 Censorship has been claimed as
well as government pressure.144
Japan dropped in freedom of the press ranking worldwide from 61 to 72 in 2016. The
report indicated that factors include self-censorship. Prime Minister Abe is said to have a more
controlling approach to the media. In one example, the communication minister Takaichi
considered issuing “a business suspension order under law to a broadcaster the government
considers politically biased.”145 Overall, Japan appears to be similar to South Korea but quite
divergent from China.
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CONCLUSION
Japan has struggled to maintain a concise historical narrative in recent decades. With a
fluctuating political system that results in annual elections for prime ministers, the narrative is
often changing. This is based upon the two divergent political parties in Japan that have very
different ideological standpoints on how to address history.
Politicians from the conservative party often espouse the need to address history from a
more celebratory manner while those from the progressive party believe history should be
repented upon.
The narrative is often assessed by neighboring states most prominently through rhetoric,
education and commemoration. Those include the political remarks, Yasakuni Shrine visits and
history textbooks. In turn, when a certain political party is in power it will play a role in
impacting these matters. For example, the Ministry of Education and the textbook assessment
process is done through individuals generally appointed by the ruling government.
The domestic debate has often pitted politicians, authors and even civil society members
against one another. To add to the quandary, the victimology complex comes into play. Japan has
often espoused that it was a victim as well with the atomic bombings endured in World War II.
Citizens have claimed that many did not want to be involved in the imperial route but that
military leaders that governed the nation led them awry.
Japan has made efforts to repent with apologies and other examples. Yet, at other times, it
has gone against such apologies by examining the authenticity of the comfort women matter or
making statements that go against repentance. Some have voiced its positive role in helping
South Korea to become the nation it is today.
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Flipping from one end to the other has resulted in contentious relations with China and
South Korea. Periods of peace are interrupted by points of controversy. Japan’s overall approach
is similar to South Korea in that it is generally persuasive rather than coercive. However, Japan
also has made a few recent developments that hint at an authoritative approach.
In recent times, Japan has made efforts to militarize amidst opposing voices from China
and South Korea. Overall, the inability to maintain a conclusive approach continues to spark
controversy with neighboring states.
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CHAPTER VI
ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION
Each case study chapter revealed the extent to which states utilized rhetoric, education,
commemoration, compensation and punishment to maintain the historical narrative. This chapter
will provide an analysis of each state through a cross comparison. An examination of similarities
and differences are provided. In what ways are the states most similar? What connects them,
what do they wrestle with? By contrast, what distinguishes their approaches? What makes them
differ?
It will be followed by an assessment of overall strategies by state. What was each state
prone to utilizing and how? Moreover, where are the states today? Have they made progress or
are there setbacks? Lastly, an assessment of the role of historical memory in foreign politics is
revealed.
HISTORICAL MEMORY WAR
The preceding chapters have indicated the extent to which a state will exercise its power
to evoke a message through such mediums. The examined sectors are the primary vehicles for
states to maintain historical narratives. It enables them to deliver a centralized message both
domestically and internationally. However, those same mediums have caused high levels of
political tension among states.
China and South Korea have maintained a relatively consistent stance on messaging to
Japan in the past decade, thereby emitting a more singular official historical narrative. Indeed it
appears that both nations have somewhat increased in enmity toward the third nation in the last
few years.
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In juxtaposition, Japan has emitted a volatile historical narrative—one that moves from
apologizing in one medium, while simultaneously visiting the Yasakuni Shrine or approving a
revisionist textbook. In other instances, the apologies have been lackluster as compared to prior
statements while the leadership avoids shrine visitations.
Trilateral relations appear to be quelled by sporadic acceptance of grievances, only to be
plundered by another textbook incident or shrine visit. The last decade has seen some of the
highest levels of tension within a region that is mired by common security threats and economic
relations.
RHETORIC
The extolment of history in rhetoric is not disputed. The difference lies in how the stance
on history has shifted over time. For a nation that once absolved Japan of its predilections, China
has reversed its stance. The political leadership has continuously articulated its position on
history.
South Korea, under a military ruler, also exonerated Japan through a bilateral treaty in
which the former received financial gains. Today, the nation’s leaders have maintained calls for
Japan to present a correct history. In the last few years under former President Geun-hye, South
Korea’s stance against Japan has hardened even further.
During much of Jintao’s term, Koizumi’s Yasakuni Shrine visitations provoked a
response from Jintao or his foreign minister. Compared to his predecessor, Jintao was relatively
milder in his tone and rhetoric. He rather preferred to convey his predilections through actions
such as cancelling bilateral meetings and summits.
By contrast, Jinping focused on patriotism and the need to never forget history. He
further espoused the need to not conceal the past and at times remarked about the commonality
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with South Korea in its past with Japan.1 At times, Jinping was vocal with mention of aggression
and Japanese militants.
Similarly, South Korea’s leaders went through an evolution in their rhetorical doctrine on
Japan. Bak often made generalized statements regarding the need to maintain correct history and,
similar to Jinping, the need to never forget. He also once noted that we must also move on from
history. In another context Bak highlighted the need to educate the youth. In one of his more rare
remarks, he noted the harsh colonial rule that the nation endured.2
Park went further than Bak by continuously mentioning the comfort women matter.
Indeed, she made it the focal point for advancing bilateral relations with Japan. In addition, she
often called on Japan to present a correct history.3 In contrast to other leaders, she highlighted the
efforts of Germany in repenting for its past.4
In juxtaposition, Japan’s rhetoric oscillated with the highest frequency in the span of a
decade. Indeed, Japan saw high turnover with seven prime ministers in office over a ten-year
time period. With the fluctuation of political parties in power, the dialogue has also shifted.
While Koizumi was known for his annual Yasakuni Shrine visits, successive prime ministers
avoided the site. Another prime minister would be elected only to return to the apologetic stance
once more. Shinzo Abe directed the commissioning of a group to determine whether the comfort
women system took place.
Japan was more complex in its ever-evolving historical stance. For some time a great
number of apologies were emitted to China and South Korea. The most recognizable is the
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Murayama statement. Some prime ministers have maintained that tradition of apologizing and
others have gone against it. In perhaps his most controversial speech, he recognized the mistakes
the nation made but stressed the need to move on from the past.
COMMEMORATION
States have not forgone the symbolical representation of history through commemorative
efforts nor the significance of such efforts. Indeed, China, Japan and South Korea continue to
erect more museums since decades past. Today, they often number in the tens of thousands.
China most often highlights the war with Japan and the Nanjing massacre. The Memorial
Museum of People’s Resistance to Japan was created back in 1987,5 with exhibits extolling the
experiences of those who endured suffering during the war.
South Korea has erected perhaps more museums than China in reference to the past with
Japan. The most notable include the Seoul Museum of History and its exhibition on the
discrimination of Koreans by the Japanese to the National Museum of Contemporary history that
highlights the colonial rule.6 Perhaps most poignant is the Seodaemun Prison History Museum
that commemorates where Koreans who fought for the nation’s independence were tortured and
killed.7
While China and South Korea have several museums that highlight their respective
experience as the recipient of Japanese aggression, Japan’s museums focus on the sacrifice of
individuals for the nation. The Chiran Peace Museum honors soldiers who perished during
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World War II and the Shokeikan and Showakan museums recognize the suffering and sacrifice
of soldiers.8
The most controversial is the Yasakuni Shrine. The honoring of the war dead and the 13
Class A War criminals and visits by prime ministers have ignited the indignation of neighboring
states.
In other areas all three have maintained an effort to further commemorate with ceremonies,
holidays and monuments. In line with the victim narrative, China commemorates December 13
as the National Memorial Day in which to remember the Nanjing massacre that China endured
from the Japanese.9 In addition, September 3 is Victory Day, which recognizes Japan’s defeat.10
Although China has erected monuments and statues to honor patriotic fighters, the state has
further erected a memorial to remember the Korean national who killed and fought the Japanese
in China.
South Korea recognizes the day in which patriots first launched the independence
movement on March 1.11 In addition, August 15 is recognized and celebrated as the day that the
nation was liberated from Japan.12 Such holidays are often celebrated with great fanfare and
remarks by the nation’s president. Similar to China, it has erected numerous monuments and
statues, yet the most notable is the statue of a young girl that symbolizes the anguish of the
comfort women.
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In juxtaposition, Japan focuses on the day its nation was founded through its February 11
National Foundation Day.13 The only semblance to World War II is the May 3 holiday that
remembers the creation of a new constitution after the conclusion of the war.14 Ceremonial
aspects are held in a more general context such as the August 15 honoring of those who passed in
war conflicts.
Each state has made efforts to commemorate the past within the context of the narrative
in which they choose to impose. China and South Korea maintain the victim narrative while
Japan seeks a more neutral stance of remembering those who sacrificed and honoring past lives.
EDUCATION
The Japanese history textbooks that neglect to proffer Japan’s indomitable role in history
have elicited strong reactions from neighboring states. As the textbooks are approved by a
government ministry, it is viewed as part of the state’s official historical narrative. Thus, Japan
and China have condemned such actions as woefully negligent. It is not only about what message
Japan is sending to China and South Korea through these textbooks, but also what they are
saying to their own millions of citizens.
Since the 1980s, the textbook controversy has imploded at various points in time.
Although collaborative efforts have been undertaken in hopes to advance relations, the matter
still plagues relations. Japan has made efforts to maintain a more nuanced view of history by
depicting past roles within history with little details. The state is often accused of not placing
historical details in the country’s role with comfort women, brutal takeover of South Korea and
the Nanjing massacre. From the 2001 controversy with the comfort women to the 2005
controversy, Japan has faced backlash from China and South Korea. With the ministry’s ability
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to approve textbooks, they have maintained a stronghold on what information is taught at
schools.
Across the board, it appears that all three states have utilized the construction of history
in textbooks. The role of education is highly valued as a cultural norm and there is significant
importance placed on educating the youth.
China’s launch of the patriotic education campaign in 1991 is considered its seminal
approach to indoctrinating future generations with patriotism to the state and the communist
party. In tandem, patriotic education bases were created which primarily consisted of memorials
and museums. The state further distributed general guidelines on addressing history. Similar to
South Korea and Japan, a ministry approves all textbooks. Much like China, South Korea has a
ministry that approves any textbook that is disseminated in the education system. Guidelines are
also emitted that provide a curriculum on Korean history and the national spirit.
DIFFERENCES
These three nations appear to contrast most significantly in the areas of punishment and
compensation. The varying levels are impacted by the type of government that is in place. As the
only authoritarian regime in the group, China has the singular ability and power to execute
directives at will.
However, in some instances it appears that democratic states can go further in emitting
punishments in one area as compared to another. China, with its state media, has control over
journalists. South Korea, on the other hand, can only express dismay at critical journal pieces,
but has chosen to punish pro-Japanese collaborators with land reform.
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COMPENSATION
China, like other countries, has recognized families of those who have fought for the
nation. However, they have gone a step further in identifying “martyrs” and providing financial
aid.15 Unlike South Korea, China has not sought compensation from Japan for comfort women,
even though Chinese nationals were forced into the role.
South Korea has vehemently sought financial restitution for comfort women survivors
from Japan, resulting in a resolution in 2015. Japan has often made the claim that no future
reparations can be demanded based on the San Francisco treaty. Yet, in recent times they have
worked with South Korea regarding the comfort women matter. Japanese corporations have paid
out restitutions to nationals from other states who were forced to work.
On an internal level, Japan has provided compensation to bereaved families of those who
fought in previous wars. Lastly, the Yasakuni Shrine is considered a spiritual reward for those
who gave their lives in honor of the country.
While all states have compensated veterans with remunerations and celebrate patriots,
South Korea is perhaps most unique in that they sold parcels of land that were owned by proJapanese colonialists. The financial revenue was then dispersed to individuals of families that
were committed to the nation’s independence. South Korea is unique in that they were one of the
rare states to enact such measures.
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PUNISHMENT
China is known for its control over media and Internet censorship laws that push state
propaganda. While examples of state persecution against those who go against the state’s
historical narrative were not discovered, China in general has made headlines for oppressing
journalists and political advocates who seek a more democratic form of government.
South Korea was the most advanced in relation to their punishment efforts. Societally,
those who collaborated and worked in tandem with the Japanese in the past are considered
traitors to the state.16 Recent legislation and acts have highlighted this as a seminal topic.
For example, an act was created to investigate anti-national activities under Japanese
imperialism. Extensive land reform laws enabled the state to obtain land from Japanese
collaborators’ descendants. The proceeds from the land sales went to the families of those who
fought for the nation’s independence.
Japan, on the other hand, has not made extensive efforts to punish those who go against
their fluctuating status quo. Indeed, it would appear that individual citizens are the ones who are
split into two camps—those who believe Japan did right in the past and those who feel that they
should express repentance.
All three states had varying levels of journalistic freedom and rights. China was the most
stringent with its media outlets and the ability to revoke a journalist’s pass. South Korea’s
government would express criticism of journalists or articles that were critical of the president.
Japan, on the other hand, was intriguing in that journalists practiced self-censorship, out of
respect for the nation. It is a cultural norm in the industry that some things are off limits.
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STRATEGIES
To determine what strategic efforts a country has made, one must consider what actions
they have chosen. What offensive and defensive choices have they made? Further, what have
they allowed versus disallowed?
From 2005 to 2015, China exercised its ability to extol and reiterate the transgressions of
Japan’s past. Simultaneously, China used the medium to disclose its dismay following
insufficient apologies, revisionist textbooks and the Yasakuni Shrine visits. Leadership often
responded to such incidents with calls for correction and building diplomatic tensions. At times,
remarks were stated in front of a domestic and international audience.
Demonstrations have been allowed to persist in the aftermath of the controversy
surrounding Japan’s revisionist textbooks and the prime ministers’ visits to the shrine. For a
nation that controls freedom of the press and maintains human rights abuses, it has managed to
allow citizens to express their opinions on the matters. Similarly, South Korea, a democratic
nation, has allowed demonstrations and riots to take place. Such actions are viewed as the
government approving such individual choices.
China and South Korea have both canceled high-level meetings with Japan at various
points in the past. In the extreme, they have recalled ambassadors from Japan. Among the
different strategies, this is the highest level of action and one that is rarely utilized.
By contrast, Japan has balanced its messaging by apologizing explicitly one year and
visiting the Yasakuni Shrine the next. Other times, the nation has sought truth commissions to
determine the validity of historical events. Most prominently, Japan moved to resolve the
comfort women matter in 2015 with financial restitutions.
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WHERE ARE THEY NOW?
The three countries have varied in relation to advancements with how they view and
portray history. In some ways all three have made advancements and had setbacks. China has
continued the narrative of being the victim and highlighting Japan’s aggression. Overall, their
efforts have been relatively steady across the five factors. However, the rhetorical aspect has
somewhat peaked in recent times with the new president. He has been more vocal about the past
and even made remarks while visiting South Korea by noting the commonality the bilateral states
faced with Japan.
By contrast, South Korea has made some recent advancements, along with having some
setbacks. The textbook controversy has brought some peace in recent years. The bilateral and
trilateral efforts to create a common history textbook has provided an avenue toward
collaboration. This has brought some assistance in moving the matter in a more tranquil way.
In relation to rhetoric, the nation has faced some setbacks. Over the course of a decade
the remarks became more pivotal in highlighting Japanese aggression, and the need to portray
history in an accurate light. In recent years with President Geun-Hye, the comfort women matter
came to the forefront of bilateral relations with Japan. Her push for Japan to resolve the matter in
order for diplomatic relations to move forward pressed Japan into a resolution in 2015. However,
members of civil society have struggled with the bilateral deal. A controversial statue of a young
girl symbolizing the comfort women was prevented from being removed in one of South Korea’s
cities. It caused Japanese outrage in consideration of the 2015 bilateral resolution and the recall
of a Japanese official from South Korea.17 With President Geun-Hye’s impeachment, it is
unknown how the state will advance in the future with regard to the comfort women matter.
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Japan, on the other hand, has moved through various stances over the course of the past
decade. Some prime ministers elected not to visit the polemical Yasakuni Shrine, while others,
like Koizumi, persisted in visiting during his multiple terms. Shinzo Abe has not visited the
shrine in the past four years and neighboring states have not had reason to demonstrate or oppose
Japan. In relation to the textbook matters, no recent incidents have brought forth controversy.
Abe’s decision to form a commission to examine the validity of the comfort women
matter was considered a setback. The act was viewed as Japan’s inability to accept responsibility
in refuting the past. Subsequent results revealed the validation of the comfort women system and
the 2015 resolution with South Korea helped move bilateral relations forward.
At this point in time, it appears that the states have made advancements in this historical
memory war. However, there are still some tensions that are harbored by the governments and
individual citizens. It still remains a problem that is not one that I would consider to be
completely eradicated.
ROLE OF HISTORICAL MEMORY
Historical memory is generally not perceived as an existential threat such as nuclear
weapons, and yet it yields a great deal of power and influence. It has the ability to stymie
diplomatic relations, cancel high level talks and embolden citizens of a nation. It further induces
a state to collaborate less, communicate and engage less often, and limits trust.
For East Asia it has strained diplomatic relations to the point that engagement is highly
limited. It has the ability to spill over into other areas of engagement. Diplomatic incidents can
fester or implode into an international incident. Territorial disputes have been relatively peaceful
but, as of late, the maritime aggression has risen. It has led to concerns that it could draw the
region into military combat.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The original hypotheses were that South Korea and Japan would utilize commemoration,
rhetoric and education in maintaining their historical narratives while China would utilize all five
factors. Contrary to the aforementioned hypotheses, I find that while South Korea has utilized the
three factors of commemoration, rhetoric and education, the country also implemented strategies
in the compensation and punishment fields. Japan, on the other hand, focused primarily on the
three original factors of commemoration, rhetoric, education and, to some extent, compensation.
Perhaps most surprisingly, China did not engage in all five factors. Indeed, the state focused on
commemoration, rhetoric, education and compensation to a certain extent.
Four primary themes have arisen from this study. First, historical memory is significant,
particularly for political leaders. The level of emphasis and resources that are placed on historical
memory is significant. History, in this case, has the ability to mobilize thousands of citizens to
demonstrate and protest against a nation state. On a national level, it has the ability to
temporarily freeze diplomatic relations and recall high-level ambassadors.
Second, China and South Korea have maintained relatively stable official historical
memory narratives. Although they have shifted from previous times when they absolved Japan,
in contemporary times they have remained consistent in their stance against Japan. By contrast,
Japan has displayed a volatile official historical memory narrative over the course of the past
decade.
Third, in spite of such volatility from Japan, small progress has been made. The Yasakuni
Shrine visits have stopped in the last four years. Trilateral efforts were initiated to create a
collaborative history textbook in hopes of mitigating the textbook controversy. The comfort
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women issue has been officially resolved through the 2015 bilateral deal between South Korea
and Japan.
Lastly, historical memory is likely to be part of the future of political relations and
continue to affect the region in the near future. Political leaders continue to espouse their
respective historical memory narratives through rhetoric, education, commemoration,
punishment and compensation. Although some progress has been made, the states continue to
grapple with history.
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